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CHAPTER I 
 
 
ESSAY 1: FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
FOR OECD COUNTRIES: A SYSTEM APPROACH 
Abstract 
In this essay I investigate the long run and short run relationship between financial 
development and economic growth for 12 high income OECD countries in most efficient 
manner via system method. ADF, KPSS tests for unit root, Johansen-Juselius 
cointegration and Parks CCR tests, ECM and SURECM, and Granger causality test in 
system method are used as empirical evidence. Based on the results of Granger causality 
test in system method, I found: 1) strong evidence that causality exists between the 
financial development and economic growth, more specifically, direction of causality is 
bidirectional in most of the cases; 2) an evidence of positive causality running from 
finance to growth when DCBY (the share of domestic credit issued by banks to GDP) is 
used as financial proxy, which highlights the importance of bank loan to promote 
investment and economic growth; and 3) an evidence of reverse causality relationship, 
when LLY (the share of liquid liability to GDP) is used as a financial proxy ; 4) selection 
of control variables does affect the model specification and the direction of causality for 
European countries and GSY (the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP) accurately 
captures causality relationship for European countries than TY (the ratio of total trade to  
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GDP) due to economic features of the markets; and 5) system method is superior to 
traditional regression methods. These results are consistent with earlier literature in that 
the direction of causality may be country specific. However, it does not support King and 
Levine’s (1993a) conclusion that finance is a leading sector to economic growth. These 
conclusions might shed the light to further guidance as to whether a well-developed 
financial sector is a necessary condition for a higher growth rates not only for high 
income countries but for developing  countries and provide further policy implication for 
them.  
 
Keywords: Financial development, economic growth, causality, cointegration, VECM, 
CCR, SURECM 
 
JEL Classifications: C22, C23, O16, G18, G28 
INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth and study the effectiveness of financial development 
for high income OECD countries by using system approach. In conducting this study, 
Johansen-Juselius (1991) cointegration test, Park’s (1992) Canonical Cointegrating 
Regression (CCR), Error Correction Model (ECM), as well as Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Error Correction Model (SURECM) and Granger (1969) causality tests in a 
system method are used as empirical evidence. The study will present further evidence 
concerning the debate over whether financial development leads economic growth in a 
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Granger causality sense among high income OECD countries. The main contribution of 
this study is to examine the dynamics and causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in multivariate SURECM setting for countries under 
the investigation. The empirical evidence from SURECM and Granger causality test 
provides further evidence on relationship between the financial development and 
economic growth, because the system method in this study accounts for cross equation 
correlations among countries and utilizes information in the variance-covariance matrix 
of residual to improve the efficiency of statistical estimates.  
There are conflicting theoretical as well as empirical arguments regarding the role 
and importance of financial development. The main findings of this study support the 
hypothesis that two-way causal relationship exists between financial development and 
economic growth and there is no unidirectional causality exists between finance and 
growth. Based on the results of ECM, SURECM and Granger causality test, in addition to 
bidirectional causality we found the evidence of positive causality running from finance 
to economic growth and reverse causality from growth to finance, which is consistent 
with conclusions of Demetriades and Luintel (1996), Arestis and Demetriades (1997), 
Shan, Morris and Sun (2001) conclusions. This result is consistent with earlier literature 
in that the direction of causality may be country specific.  
However, one-way causality results are greatly affected by selection of financial 
proxy. Positive causality between financial development and economic growth has been 
mainly observed when DCBY (the share of domestic credit issued by banks to GDP) is 
used as a measure of financial development and reverse causality relationship, when LLY 
(the share of liquid liability to GDP) is used as a financial proxy. The main findings in 
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these essays show a little evidence that financial development is a necessary and 
sufficient precondition to economic growth. Furthermore sensitivity analysis has been 
done by studying the countries based on geographical region such as European and non-
European countries. The main reason to divide countries into two groups is based on 
rational that even though our sample contains homogeneous countries in terms of income 
levels and standards of living, however, they are heterogeneous in terms of cultural 
background, trade barriers, distance to borders, history, membership in European Union 
and geographical location. In order to remove the heterogeneity issue, the sample size has 
been divided into two sub-groups such as European and non-European countries. The 
findings illustrate that European countries have statistically significant point estimates of 
speed of adjustment coefficients, which show the stronger evidence of cointegration in 
the region among the high income countries.  
Another important contribution of this essay is the econometric method used to 
examine the relationship between financial development and economic growth. Previous 
research employed traditional OLS, cross-sectional study or panel cointegration test to 
examine the causality relationship. However, this is the first attempt in this field to study 
this relationship using system method. The findings demonstrate that the system method 
is superior to single equation approach. This essay is organized as follows. Section 1 
describes the literature review, Section 2 explains the data, econometric methodology 
used and model specification, Section 3 contains the empirical results, and finally Section 
4 discusses the summary and conclusion. The question might give some further guidance 
as to whether a well-developed financial sector is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
a higher growth rates for developing countries and provide an important policy 
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implication both for OECD countries as well as for countries that have financial sectors 
that are comparatively underdeveloped. 
I.1. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theoretical approach 
Financial development and economic growth is the question of causality and 
direction of causality, which has been studied both from theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. There is no common agreement among economists that financial 
development is beneficial for economic growth. Financial development can influence the 
economic growth through allocation of resources. This theory has been introduced and 
discussed by Joseph Schumpeter in 1911, who has emphasized the role of financial 
development on economic growth. He identifies that financial markets can influence the 
growth, in particular, financial markets by: 1) reducing the transaction cost and 
facilitating risk management, 2) mobilizing and pooling savings, 3) facilitating the 
exchange of goods and services, 4) providing information set for future investment, and 
5) monitoring investment and exercising corporate governance.  An important part of his 
discussion is that financial intermediaries make possible technological innovation and 
economic development.  
An alternative view was discussed by Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973), which emphasizes the role of capital accumulation in economic growth. 
They came to conclusion that the development of financial intermediaries increases 
capital accumulation and reduces the cost of external finance to firms, which in return 
leads to overall economic growth. McKinnon and Shaw view that financial development 
is playing a key role in the process of economic growth. In addition to them, the recent 
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endogenous growth literatures emphasize the role of financial intermediaries by showing 
that these institutions can contribute to economic development through various aspects of 
productive activities, which was discussed by Pagano (1993). Levine and Zervos (1998), 
Levine (2005), pointed out that a more developed financial sector promotes economic 
growth.  
On the contrary, several well-known economists are somewhat skeptical about the 
role of financial development to economic growth, such as Robinson (1952), Stiglitz 
(1994), and Singh and Weisse (1998). They concluded that the economic development 
puts additional demand on financial sector and the finance simply follows the economic 
growth. This view is mainly described as demand-leading relationship between the 
financial development and economic growth. 
Lucas (1988) expressed that the role of financial development is “over-stressed”. 
According to Lucas, “there is no one pattern of growth to which all economies conform”, 
thus he pointed out that too much attention has given to role of financial development to 
economic growth.  
Recent theorists argue that there is a two-way relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Among them, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
discuss a model in which both financial sector and economic growth are endogenously 
determined. The model shows bidirectional causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth.  
Levine (2005) argued that financial development might stimulate the economy 
through promoting investment and productivity growth. However, in return an increasing 
level of real income might create higher demands for financial services from both 
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household and businesses, which is shown in Figure 1. Levine pointed out that financial 
development is not the only leading and the most important factor of economic growth.  
Empirical approach 
Most of the recent literature examined the causality between the financial 
development and economic growth from the empirical perspective. Many researchers 
studied the direction of causality and the role of financial development in single country 
cases such as Australia, China, Egypt, India, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Poland, 
Russia, Turkey, and Taiwan.  Shan (2003) examined the evidence of financial 
development on economic growth in China and found the empirical evidence that 
“financial development and economic growth exhibit a two-way causality and hence it’s 
against the so-called “finance-led growth” hypothesis”.  Chang and Caudill (2005) 
examined the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
Taiwan from 1962 to 1998 using VAR model and tested the competing hypothesis of 
demand-following versus supply-leading. The test result revealed a unidirectional 
causality from financial development to economic growth and supported the supply-
leading hypothesis for Taiwanese economy. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) also tested 
causality in Egypt during the period 1960-2001. Their findings also suggested that 
financial development Granger causes economic growth “either through increasing 
investment efficiency or through increasing resources for investment”. Liang and Teng 
(2006) examined the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
China during the period of 1952-2001. But their empirical results suggested a totally 
opposite conclusion: there is a unidirectional reverse causality from economic growth to 
financial development. Shan and Jianhong (2006) also examined the relationship between 
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financial development and economic growth for China using variance decomposition and 
impulse response function in the VAR system. Their findings suggested that financial 
development is the second force (first is contribution from labor input) leading to 
economic growth and found that there is a two-way causality, which also supported 
previous studies that “finance-led growth” hypothesis does not hold. Ang and McKibbin 
(2007) also tested causality from financial development to economic growth or vice versa 
in the small open economy of Malaysia. Their findings support demand-following 
hypothesis and suggest that financial development and economic growth are reversely 
related, and economic growth leads to higher financial development but not vice versa 
(supports Robinson’s view).  
However, recently a great deal of attention given to examine the causality pattern 
for a group of countries such as Asian economies, Middle Eastern countries, developing 
economies, OECD countries and post socialist economies as well. The empirical studies 
to examine the causality between financial development and economic growth employed 
two broad econometric approaches such as cross-sectional and time-series analysis. King 
and Levine (1993a) examined a cross-section of 80 countries and concluded that 
“financial services stimulate economic growth by increasing the rate of capital 
accumulation and by improving the efficiency with which economies use that capital.” 
Levine (1997), Levine (1998), and Levine and Zervos (1998) employed cross-sectional 
modeling framework and the empirical results of these studies supported the hypothesis 
that the financial development Granger cause economic growth.  
Some studies use time-series modeling framework and argue that time-series 
approach is more fruitful than the cross-sectional approach. Demetriades and Hussein 
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(1996) found little support to the view that finance is a leading sector in the process of 
economic development. They findings demonstrated that “causality patterns vary across 
countries and, therefore, highlights the danger of statistical inference based on cross-
section country studies which implicitly treat different economies as homogeneous 
entities”. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) performed a cross-sectional analysis implicitly 
assuming that countries share similar economic structures, populations and technologies. 
They obtained positive and significant effect between financial development and real 
economic growth on German data and didn’t get any sufficient proof for US data, which 
bring out the conclusion that cross country regression may not be a well approach. They 
suggested that using “time-series methods and taking into accounts individual country 
circumstance, including the institutional and policy considerations”, might produce a 
better outcome.  
Many cross-sectional studies failed to consider the possibility of reverse causality 
from economic growth to financial development. Levine and Zervos (1998) showed that 
“stock market liquidity and banking development both positively predict growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity” and found “a strong, positive link between financial 
development and economic growth” and concluded that financial factors are an integral 
part of the growth process. However, even they recognized reverse causality, but did not 
test reverse causality hypothesis. Ahmed and Ansari (1998) noted that “some inherent 
limitations of a pure cross-section study of this type to be able to isolate the causal 
influence of bank development on growth”. Also Gujarati (1995) and Shan and Sun 
(1998) noted that the failure to consider reverse causality might produce the problem of 
simultaneity bias and weak theoretical foundations underpinning the models.  
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Sims (1972) first used time-series studies into financial development and 
economic growth. He studied feedback effects between income and money for the US 
data. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) performed the causality tests for 16 developing 
countries and found bidirectional causality in 8 countries and reverse causality in 8 
countries. They came to conclusion that “causality patterns vary across countries and, 
therefore, highlights the dangers of statistical inference based on cross-section country 
studies which implicitly treat different countries as homogeneous entities”. Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997) also got the similar results. Luintel and Khan (1999) studied the 
long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth by employing 
multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) method using the data of 10 developing 
countries. They found the evidence of only bidirectional causality for all countries, which 
was distinct from all previous studies. Shan, Morris and Sun (2001) estimated a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model for nine OECD countries and China and found 
bidirectional causality between financial development and economic growth in half of the 
countries, and reverse causality in three countries, and no evidence of one-way causality. 
They got a little support that financial development leads to economic growth. Based on 
these results they suggested that “financial sector is not a leading sector in the course of 
economic growth”. Shan and Morris (2002) investigated the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth for 19 OECD countries and China. In 
investigating causality between financial development and economic growth, when they 
used total credit as financial proxy, they found evidence of no causality for 10 countries, 
bidirectional causality for 4 countries, one-way causality from finance to growth for 2 
countries, and reverse causality for 4 countries. They found the similar evidence even 
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when they employed the financial efficiency (or the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP) to 
measure the financial development: 10 countries with no causality, 6 countries with 
bidirectional causality, 2 countries with one-way causality running from finance to 
economic growth, and 2 countries with reverse causality running from economic growth 
to finance. The empirical evidence gives little support to the hypothesis that financial 
development “leads” economic growth, and supports the conclusions of Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997) and Demetriades and Hussein (1996) that the link between financial 
development and economic growth may be country specific and might be affected by 
differences in industrial structures and cultures of countries under the investigation.  They 
suggested that the financial development is a not necessary and sufficient precondition to 
economic growth.  
Al-Yousif (2002) examined the nature and direction of causality between the 
financial development and economic growth using both time-series and panel data from 
30 developing countries for the period of 1970-1999. His findings strongly support the 
view that financial development and economic growth are “mutually causal” or there is 
bidirectional causality. However, he found some support of positive and reverse causality 
between the finance and economic growth, and as well as for the view that there is no 
relationship, but these findings were not strong as with bidirectional causality.  Clearly, 
the empirical results of Al-Yousif’s paper were in line with other empirical studies that 
“the relationship between financial development and economic growth cannot be 
generalized across countries because economic policies are country specific and their 
success depends, among other things, on the efficiency of the institutions implementing 
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them”. All these results show there is no one generalized agreement on the role of 
financial development in the process of economic growth.  
On the other hand, many researchers used panel data studies. Calderon and Liu 
(2003) examined the direction of causality between financial development and economic 
growth on panel data of 109 developing and industrial countries. They found the evidence 
that financial development generally leads to economic growth through a more rapid 
capital accumulation and productivity growth. They got support to the hypothesis that the 
Granger causality between finance and economic growth coexist. Finally, Calderon and 
Liu (2003) suggested that “financial deepening contributes more to causal relationships in 
the developing countries than in the industrial countries”.  Christopoulos and Tsionas 
(2004) examined the long run relationship between the financial development and 
economic growth by using panel unit root test and panel cointegration analysis for 10 
developing countries. The results suggest that there is a strong evidence of long run 
causality from financial development to growth and no short run causality between 
financial deepening and output, pointing that the effect is necessary long run in nature. So 
they have concluded that “policies aiming at improving financial markets will have a 
delayed effect on growth, but this effect is significant’. Hassan, Sanchez, and Yu (2011) 
investigated the role of financial development for economic growth in low- and middle-
income countries classified by geographic regions by employing panel data. The 
empirical evidence finds positive relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in developing countries, bidirectional causality (or two-way causality) 
for most regions, and reverse (or one-way) causality from growth to finance for the two 
poorest regions. They also examined the role of other control variables and found that 
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trade and government expenditures play an import role in explaining economic growth. 
Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) concluded that a well-developed and well-functioning 
financial system is “a necessary but not sufficient condition to reach economic growth in 
developing countries”.  
The empirical results of previous studies are somewhat ambiguous. On one hand, 
cross-sectional and panel data analysis find that the causality runs from finance to growth 
after accounting for other growth determinants such as trade, government spending, gross 
savings and the inflation rate. However, on the other hand, economist using time-series 
techniques find evidence of one-way, bidirectional, and no-causality between the 
financial development and economic growth.  Therefore, it’s not certain that there is a 
relationship between financial development and economic growth exists and what is the 
direction of this relationship. In order to answer to this question and find the direction of 
causality, Park’s CCR, SURECM, and Granger causality test in the system method were 
employed to improve the efficiency of statistical estimates. This study is different from 
previous literature for number of reasons: 
1. The cointergation framework of Johansen-Juselius (1991) and Park’s CCR (1992) are 
applied to test for multivariate cointegrating relationships. Cointegrating vectors are 
estimated using Park’s CCR, which allows consistent and efficient estimation of 
cointegrating vectors. 
2. To examine the relationship between the financial development and economic growth, 
seemingly unrelated regression error correction model (SURECM) and the Granger 
causality test in a system method are employed. Seemingly unrelated regression 
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methodology accounts for cross equation correlations among countries in the sample and 
utilizes the information in the variance-covariance matrix of residual to improve the 
efficiency of statistical estimates The empirical evidence of this study clearly 
demonstrates that the system method is superior to single equation approach. 
I.2. METHODOLOGY 
I.2.1 Data 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the causal relationship between 
financial development and economic growth by using data for 12 high income OECD 
countries such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States over the period of 1971-2006. The 
sample periods covering 1970 through 2006 are the periods of development of financial 
institutions and financial liberalization in many countries. This period can also be 
characterized as periods of output expansion, money growth, trade and investment 
increase, and globalization. For example, this period is characterized as a period of 
financial liberalization in the United States, which greatly sped up the consolidation of 
banking institutions and financial innovation. Since 1999, when The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 was adopted by US Congress, the way was 
open to consolidation in terms of not only of number of banks, but also across financial 
service activities. Banking institutions not only became larger, but also very complex, 
providing wide array of financial services to their customers. Abolishing Regulation Q, 
which powers Federal Reserve to set maximum limit of savings deposit interest rate, 
MacFadden Act of 1927, prohibiting banks from branching across state lines, and erosion 
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of Glass Steagall Act accelerated financial innovation, widened the scope of financial 
intermediary services by banks, which contributed tremendously to economic growth 
across United States. On worldwide level, similar developments were recorded in almost 
every industrialized country. However, the pattern of economic growth and financial 
development appear to differ over time and across countries.  
The data frequency is annual. All the data are obtained from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators 2009 (WDI) database except the data on liquid liabilities, 
which was obtained from International Monetary Fund International Finance Statistics 
(2009).  
Indicators to measure the Economic Growth and Financial Development 
The selection of variables in this model is based on the theoretical as well as 
empirical framework of previous studies. One of the important issues in this study is the 
selection of proxies to measure financial development and economic growth. For 
economic development, the natural logarithm of real GDP (LY) is used to measure 
economic growth and the main reason of using natural logarithm is based on the 
econometrics method employed in this study to examine the direction of causality in 
Granger sense based on SURECM. Levine and Zervos (1998) and Arestis, Demetriades, 
and Luintel (2001) suggested that even though both banks and stock markets could 
promote the economic growth, the effects of banks are far more significant. Following 
this conclusion, bank-based measures of financial development variables are used in this 
study rather than stock market-based financial structures.  
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There is not a single empirical definition of financial development (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009). Previous studies have used various indicators to 
measure financial development. Following King and Levine (1993a), Levine and Zervos 
(1998), and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009), and the standard literature, three 
different measures of financial proxy are used.  First proxy is the domestic credit to 
private sector provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP (DCBY) following 
Levine and Zervos (1998).  Higher DCBY indicates higher degree of dependence upon 
banking sector for financing and this measure of financial development is often argued to 
be the best measure of financial development, which measures the extent of efficient 
resource allocation by private sector. Second alternative measure of financial 
development, developed by King and Levine (1993a)), is the ratio of M3 to GDP (LLY) 
to measure the liquid liabilities in the economy, which is the sum of currency, demand 
and interest bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries divided by 
GDP. This is the broadest available indicator to measure the size of the financial 
intermediation.  M3 is used to measure the financial depth instead of M1 and M2, 
because in some economies with underdeveloped financial sector M1 and M2 may be 
poor proxies as money is used as a store of value in the absence of other alternative 
(Khan and Senhadji, 2000). Higher the ratio of LLY indicates the higher intensity of the 
banking system. Another alternative measure of financial development based on King 
and Levine (1993a), is the domestic credit to private sector issued by banks and other 
non-banks as a percentage of GDP (DCPSY). A high ratio of domestic credit to private 
sector to GDP shows a higher level of domestic investment, which results in higher 
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output. The regression results and Granger causality test results using DCPSY are not 
reported in this essay, however can be viewed at request from the author.  
Indicators to measure the real sector or control variables  
It’s well-known according to economic theories that factors other than financial 
development have an impact on economic growth. Following the recent literature on the 
analysis of financial development and economic growth, four other variables are used to 
control for other factor associated with economic growth, in addition to logarithm of 
GDP.  The third indicator used in this research is the ratio of gross domestic savings to 
GDP (GSY), which indicates the intensity of the financial intermediaries meaning that 
more financial services generate more financial development. Based on economic theory, 
higher gross domestic savings generates higher investment and hence higher economic 
growth. The fourth indicator is the ratio of trade to GDP (TY), which measures the size of 
real sector and trade policy. The fifth indicator is the ratio of government final 
consumption expenditures to GDP (GOVY) to measure the weight of fiscal policy. 
Seventh indicator is inflation rate (CPI), measured by CPI to measure price (in)stability in 
the economy.  
I.2.2 Model and Econometric Techniques 
To investigate long-run relationship between the economic growth and financial 
development, the following model is used:  
Yit = a0 + α1tFit + β1tXit + Uit ,       (1) 
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where Yit is a measure of economic growth, Fit is a measure of financial development, Xit 
is a set of control variables that includes commonly used variables in the literature such 
as trade volume, government expenditure, gross saving, and the inflation rate, and Uit is 
the error term. Based on the set of financial and control variables, we can re-write the 
equation (1) as following:  
Model1: LYit = a0 +a1DCBYit + b1TYit + b2GOVYit + b4CPIit + eit,   (2)  
Model 2: LYit = a0 +a1DCBYit + b2GOVYit +b3GSYit + b4CPIit + eit,  (3)  
Model 3: LYit = a0 +a1LLYit + b1TYit + b2GOVYit + b4CPIit + eit,   (4)  
Model 4: LYit = a0 +a1LLYit + b2GOVYit +b3GSYit + b4CPIit + eit.   (5)  
where LYit is natural logarithm of real GDP in country i and year t, DCBYit is the ratio of 
domestic credit issued by banks to GDP, LLYit is the ratio of liquid liability to GDP, TYit 
is the ratio of total trade to GDP, GOVYit is the ratio of government spending to GDP, 
GSYit is the ratio of gross savings to GDP, CPIit is the inflation measured by consumer 
price index, and eit is an error term.  
To investigate long-term and short run relationship between economic growth and 
financial development as well as the direction of causality, Johansen-Juselius 
cointegration test, Park’s (1992) Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR), Vector of 
Error Correction, and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Error Correction Model 
(SURECM) and Granger (1969) causality test in a system method are employed.  
Unit root and stationarity tests 
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First step in this study is to test the data for stationarity. It’s essential to test if 
variables have the tendency to return to the long term trend following a shock (stationary) 
or the variables follow a random walk (containing unit root). It’s well known that if the 
variables follow a random walk after any shock, the regression result between variables is 
spurious and series don’t have a finite variance, and as a result OLS will not produce 
consistent estimates. In this study, in order to test for stationarity, two tests are 
performed, such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which tests if series exhibit 
unit root process (6, 7, 8 and 9) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test, 
which tests if series are stationary (10, 11 and 12). 
ADF test tests whether a unit root is present in autoregressive model. Choosing 
the lag length for the ADF test is an important step for the implementation of the ADF 
test. If number of lags is too small then the remaining serial correlation in the errors will 
bias the test. If number of lags is too large then the power of the test will suffer. One 
possible approach is to examine the t-values on coefficients using General-to-specific 
approach. An alternative approach is to examine information criteria such as the Akaike 
information criterion, or Bayesian information criterion. Time series data Yt is non-
stationary if its autocorrelation coefficient ρ is one, then series explodes as time 
progresses and has no finite variance. If this is the case, we call that the series have a 
unit-root (ρ=1), or in a more technically Yt ~ I(1), meaning that Yt series has to be 
differenced once to be stationary. If we consider the following regression model: 
            .         (6) 
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In order to test for unit root, the basic equation is modified as following equations (with 
or without intercept and /or trend variables): 
              ,         (7) 
                 ,        (8) 
                    .       (9) 
These are the basic Dickey-Fuller unit root test equations. In this three equations θ 
= ρ – 1 and the testable hypothesis is ρ =1 (or θ= 0). ADF test tests whether a unit root is 
present in autoregressive model. The testing procedure for the ADF test is applied to the 
model as followings (with or without intercept and /or trend variables): 
     (    )       ∑                
 
   ,    (10) 
       (    )       ∑                
 
   ,   (11) 
       (    )          ∑                
 
   .   (12) 
where α is a constant, t is trend variables, β is coefficient for trend variable, p is 
autoregressive coefficient for series. Unit root is present if ρ=1 and the model would be 
non-stationary. The null hypothesis of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-test is followings: 
H0: ρ =1 (contain unit, the data is not stationary) versus the alternative hypothesis of  
Ha: ρ <1 (do not contain unit root, the data is stationary). 
On the contrary, KPSS test differs from ADF unit root tests in that the series are 
assumed to be (trend-) stationary under the null. KPSS test based on residuals from the 
OLS regression of Yt on the exogenous Xt. Series under KPSS test expressed as the sum 
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of deterministic trend, random walk, and stationary error term and the test is LM test of 
the hypothesis that random walk has zero variance.  As with the ADF test, there are two 
cases to distinguish between, whether to estimate with or without a linear time trend. The 
ADF unit root test is for the null hypothesis that a time series Yt  is I(1). Stationarity tests, 
on the other hand, are for the null that Yt  is I(0). The KPSS test is the most commonly 
used stationarity test. The KPSS test is derived by starting with the model: 
yt = α + βxt + υt,  υt ~iid (0, σ
2
 υ),       (13) 
xt = xt−1 + εt, εt ∼ iid (0, σ
2
 ε),        (14) 
where xt is non-stationary series and υt is stationary. Also xt is a pure random walk with 
innovation variance σ2ε. The null hypothesis that yt is I(0) is formulated as H0 : σ
2
 ε = 0, 
which implies that xt is a constant. The hypothesis of KPSS test is following:  
H0 = σ
2
 ε = 0 (variance of I(1) component is zero, series are stationary) versus the 
alternative hypothesis of  
Ha = σ
2
 ε > 0 (variance of I(1) component is not zero, series are not stationary) 
The KPSS test statistic is the Lagrange multiplier (LM) and score statistic for testing σ2 ε 
= 0 against the alternative that σ2 ε > 0 is given by: 
     (   ∑ (
 
 
 
 )    ̂    ,       (15)  
where   ̂  ∑   ̂
 
    ,   ̂ is the residual of a regression of yt on xt and  
 ̂ is a consistent 
estimate of the long-run variance of υt using   ̂. The KPSS stationarity test is a one-sided 
right-tailed test.  
 Cointegration Tests  
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When time series variables are non-stationary, it is important to see if there is a 
certain common trend between those non-stationary series. If two non-stationary series 
Xt~ I(1) and Yt~ (1) have a linear relationship such that Zt = Yt –γXt and Zt ~ I(0), (Zt is 
stationary), then we call these two series are cointegrated. Broadly speaking, 
cointegration test is equivalent to examine if the residuals of regression between two non-
stationary series are stationary. If residuals are stationary, two series Xt and Yt are 
cointegrated. Next step is to test if series are cointegrated. There are different tests have 
been employed to test for the presence of cointegration. First method used in this study to 
test for presence of cointegration is Johansen-Juselius cointegration test. 
In 1990, Soren Johansen and Katarina Juselius developed estimation and testing 
procedure for models with one or more cointegrating relationships. This method 
estimates one or more error correction equations together, obtaining estimates of the 
long-run and short-run coefficients in one pass. Johansen’s approach is to estimate the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) by maximum likelihood, under various 
assumptions about the trend or intercept parameters and the number of cointegrating 
vectors, and then conduct the likelihood ratio tests. Consider a VAR of order p:  
                         ,      (16) 
where yt is a k -vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, xt  is a d-vector of deterministic 
variables, and et is a vector of innovations. This VAR can be rewritten as following: 
          ∑   
   
                      (17) 
where   ∑          
 
       ∑    
 
           (18) 
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Granger’s representation theorem implies that if coefficient matrix Π has reduced rank 
r<k, then there exist k x r matrices α and β with rank r such that Π =αβ’ and β’yt is I(0). 
According to Johansen-Juselius method, r is the number of cointegrating relations (the 
cointegrating rank) and each column of β is the cointegrating vector, the elements of α 
are known as the adjustment parameters in the VEC model. Johansen’s method is to 
estimate the matrix from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether we can reject the 
restrictions implied by the reduced rank of Π. There are two test statistics: the trace 
statistic and the maximum eigenvalue statistic. The trace statistics test is based on the 
log-likelihood ratio ln[L
max
(r)/L
max
(k)],
 
tests the null hypothesis that the number of 
distinct cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against an alternative that the 
cointegrating rank is k. The maximum eigenvalue statistics test based on log-likelihood 
ratio ln[L
max
(r)/L
max
(r+1)], tests the null that the number of cointegrating vectors is r 
against the alternative r+1 cointegrating vectors. 
Another alternative way to test for cointegration is to use Park’s Canonical 
Cointergrating Regression (CCR). By employing Park’s CCR, we test for long-run 
relationship by computing cointegrating vectors. The main advantage of using Park’s 
CCR test is this test not only shows the number of cointegrating vectors as well as the 
presence of deterministic and stochastic cointegrating terms. Consider a cointegrated 
system where yt and xt are difference stationary, and et and vt are stationary with zero 
mean:  
            ,         (19) 
       ,          (20) 
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   (     ).          (21) 
The CCR procedure assumes that the long run covariance matrix of ωt is positive 
definite, which implies that xt is not self cointegrated. This conditions assumes that there 
is a unique cointegrating vector (1, -γ) exist. Park suggested the approach which 
transforms the model in order to get an asymptotically efficient OLS estimator: 
  
            ,         (22) 
  
            .         (23) 
Based on earlier assumption, yt* and xt* are cointegrated with the same cointegrating 
vector (1, -γ) as yt and xt for any     and    . In order to transform yt and xt, the long run 
covariance parameters are estimated to obtain     and    , where      
      
(        
  ) . Then apply Park’s G (p, q) tests to CCR residuals for the H (p, q) the null 
of stationary of OLS regression. The test hypothesis will be as following:  
H (0, 1): statistic tests the deterministic cointegrating restriction and,  
H (1, q): statistic tests for the presence of stochastic cointegration.  
Error Correction Model and Seemingly Unrelated Regression ECM 
In order to investigate the short run and long-run dynamics between the financial 
development and economic growth, an Error Correction Model was employed under the 
assumption of Zt = Yt –γX`t is stationary.  Based on results of Johansen-Juselius and 
Park’s CCR tests for cointegration, ECM can be performed knowing that variables are 
cointegrated. ECM specification restricts the long run behavior of the endogenous 
variables to converge to their cointegrating relationships still allowing for short run 
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adjustment dynamics. Through error correction term, ECM allows the discovery of 
Granger Causality relation. 
Consider the cointegrating relation         , which represents a long-term 
equilibrium relation between yt and xt and cointegrating factor Zt, which will be used to 
measure the deviation from this long-term relation. Engle and Granger suggested the 
following regression to estimate the value of α: 
             .         (24) 
The cointegrating factor Zt, can be estimated if the value of    is known by 
estimating        ̂  . This model will allow testing for both short-term and long-
term relations between two time-series and is known as error correction model or ECM. 
Then the following ECM estimates the potential short-run and long-run effects of these 
two variables on each other: 
              ̂    ∑    (           )  ∑    (           )    
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           (25) 
              ̂    ∑    (           )  ∑    (           )    
 
   
 
   . 
           (26) 
 The ECM equations given by 25 and 26 decompose the dynamic adjustments of 
the dependent variables X into two components: 1) a long-term components given by 
cointegrating terms    ̂     and    ̂   , or error correction term, and 2) a short-term 
components given by the summation terms on the right hand side of the equations. Based 
on the equations 25 and 26, variables yt and xt are cointegrated and exhibits the long-term 
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co-movements when at least one of the coefficients α1 and a1 is different from zero. If a1 
is different from zero and α1 is zero, then it said that yt follows and adjusts to xt in the 
long run. If both α1 and a1 are different from zero, x and y adjust to one another over the 
long run. The short run relation between yt and xt are given by coefficients bi and φi. It’s 
said if bi’s are not all zero and φi all zero, then x is causing y in the short run. However, if 
both coefficients are different from zero, then feedback exists and the two variables affect 
each other in the short run.  
In this study, four different models based on number of financial proxies and 
control variables have been studied (equations 2-5). In each model specification, the error 
correction term  ̂  has been estimated using the cointegrating vector obtained from Park’s 
CCR for each 12 countries in the sample. Each system of ECM equations will look as 
following (example shown in case of model 1): 
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In order to get more precise estimates, next step is to run unrestricted and 
restricted Seemingly Unrelated Regression Error Correction Model (SURECM) using the 
error correction term  ̂ , which will be estimated using the cointegration vector from 
Park’s CCR. Seemingly unrelated models are called so due to contemporaneous errors, 
which may be correlated across the system of equation.  A single model may contain a 
number of linear equations. In such a model it is often unrealistic to expect that the 
equation errors would be uncorrelated. A set of equations that has contemporaneous 
cross-equation error correlation (i.e. the error terms in the regression equations are 
correlated) is called a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system. At first look, the 
equations seem unrelated, but the equations are related through the correlation in the 
errors. Zellner (1962) suggested the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model as p 
correlated regression equations and the p regression equations are “seemingly unrelated” 
because taken separately the error terms would follow standard linear OLS linear model 
form. However, the standard OLS model normally ignores any correlation among the 
errors across equations. In SUR models the dependent variables are correlated and the 
design matrices may contain some of the same variables there may be contemporaneous” 
correlation among the errors across the p equations. Therefore, SUR models are often 
employed when there may be several equations, which appear to be unrelated; however, 
they may be related by the fact that: (1) some coefficients are the same or assumed to be 
zero; (2) the disturbances are correlated across equations; and/or (3) a subset of right 
hand side variables are the same. If all equations in the system have exactly same number 
of explanatory variables and exactly same lag-length, then there is no efficiency gain for 
running SUR. Lag-lengths in the system are determined based on BIC. So ECM for all 
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countries in the sample will be investigated as a system of seemingly unrelated equations, 
which will account for cross-equation correlation of error terms among countries. 
Granger Causality test 
 Correlation and cointegration do not necessarily imply the causation in any 
meaningful sense of this word. Many previous literatures employed one of the two 
asymptotically equivalent test procedures for testing the null hypothesis of unidirectional 
causality against the alternative of feedback such as Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) 
causality tests. In this study, in order to study for causal relationships between the 
financial development and economic growth and find the direction of causality, the 
Granger causality test has been adopted. The Granger (1969) method it to question 
whether xt causes yt  and see how much of the current value of yt can be explained by past 
values of yt and then to see whether adding lagged values of xt can improve the 
explanation of yt.  In order words, Granger causality test can be interpreted as following: 
yt said to be Granger-caused by xt if xt helps in prediction of yt and the coefficients of 
lagged values of xt are statistically significant. By running Granger causality test we 
investigate the following hypothesis: 
H0: X does not cause Y (or H0: β1 = β2 = … = βm = 0; from the VAR model Yt = ∑ αi Yt-i 
+ ∑βiXt-i + εt), against alternative hypothesis of 
Ha: X Granger cause Y. 
Rejection of null hypothesis implies that current and past lagged values of xt help predict 
the current values of yt.   Analogically, this technique can be used in investigating 
whether or not yt causes xt. In this study regular VAR based Granger causality test and 
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Granger causality test based on SURECM in system method were employed to compare 
the results of regular Granger test versus system method.  
I.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section gives the description of data analysis and discusses the results of 
various tests to investigate the relationship between the financial development and 
economic growth and find the direction of causality. The results of all tests are discussed 
in the separate subsections.  
Unit root tests 
Before proceeding to the identification of a possible relationship, it’s important to 
verify that all variables are integrated of order one in levels or they are I(1) process. In 
this study, two tests are performed to test for unit root or stationarity, such as the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which tests if series exhibit unit root and 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test, which tests if series are stationary.  
 ADF test regresses the first difference of variable against a set of lagged variables 
of itself. The null hypothesis is that the series contain a unit root against the alternative no 
unit root. Selection of lag length is an important step in the ADF test. If number of lags is 
too small then the remaining serial correlation in the errors will bias the test. If number of 
lags is too large then the power of the test will suffer. One possible way is to examine the 
t-values on coefficients using General-to-specific method also known as Hall’s method. 
An alternative approach is to examine the Akaike or Bayesian information criterion. 
Table 1.1 describes ADF test results with three different results for lag-length for 12 
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high-income OECD countries during the period 1971-2006 for eight variables such as LY 
(log of real GDP), DCBY (the ratio of domestic credit issued by banks to GDP), LLY 
(the share of liquid liabilities to GDP), TY (the ratio of total trade to GDP), GSY (the 
ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP), GOVY ( the ratio of government expenditures 
to GDP), and CPI (the inflation rate measured by CPI). In all cases, all variables for each 
country, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that they contain unit root. ADF test results 
confirm that almost all variables are non-stationary at 5 % significance level with the 
exception of GSY for Germany, DCBY, DCPSY, and GOVY for France, log of GDP for 
Italy, and TY for Korea, and GOVY for Australia, Austria, Belgium and France (which 
are already stationary in levels) and they are stationary after first differencing.  
On the contrary the null hypothesis of KPSS test is that the series are stationary 
versus an alternative of non-stationary.  The results of the KPSS tests are in Table 1.2 and 
they clearly indicate that the investigated variables are not stationary or trend-stationary, 
since in almost every case the null hypothesis at a significance level of 5% was rejected 
with exception of GSY for Sweden and CPI for Belgium (there are stationary in levels). 
Since the data selected in this study are non-stationary in levels and stationary in first 
differencing, we can now test for presence of cointegration among series. 
Cointegration Test 
It is not sufficient to conclude that the variables contain a unit root or they are 
non-stationary. It’s necessary to test for cointegration preliminary ECM, SURECM and 
Granger causality test. After determining that the data series are integrated by means of 
unit root tests, it is now essential to verify whether they do form a cointegrated system of 
variables. If time-series variables are non-stationary, the next step is to see if there is a 
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certain common trend between those non-stationary series. When two non-stationary 
series Xt~ I(1) and Yt~ (1) have a linear relationship, which is expressed as  Zt = Yt –γXt 
and Zt ~ I(0), (Zt is stationary), then we say that these two series are cointegrated. 
Cointegration test is equivalent to examine if the residuals of regression between two 
non-stationary series, Zt, are stationary. If residuals are stationary, two series Xt and Yt 
are cointegrated. In this study, there are two different methods were used to test for 
presence of cointegration or test if series are cointegrated.  
First, we employed Johansen-Juselius test for multivariate cointegration. The 
Johansen-Juselius cointegration approach produces two test statistics such as the trace, λ 
trace, and maximum eigenvalue statistics, λ max. We proceed sequentially from r = 0 to r = k 
– 1, where k is the number of endogenous variables, until fail to reject to determine the 
number of cointegrating relations, r. The two tests of the null hypothesis of r 
cointegrating relations against the alternative of k cointegrating relations, for r = 0, 1,…, 
k-1 are reported in the results tables 1.3-1.6 for all four models. Based on the results of 
trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics, we can conclude that all models exhibit at least 
one cointegrating relations. However, Johansen-Juselius test for cointegration does not 
provide information whether the series present stochastic or deterministic cointegrating 
terms. In this regard, we run Park’s CCR to test for long run relationship and presence of 
deterministic and stochastic cointegrating terms, and estimate the cointegrating vector for 
every single variable for each country and each four models. In order to run Park’s CCR, 
we adopted Masao Ogaki’s Gauss code for Park’s CCR and modified it for our data set 
and model specifications. The results of CCR are shown in Tables 1.7-1.10, which 
display the cointegrating vectors for every single country and variables in each model.  In 
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CCR result for model 1 the stochastic cointegrating restrictions are failed to reject at 5% 
significant level for all countries except Korea and US, which show the presence of 
deterministic cointegrating restrictions. In model 2 all countries exhibit the presence of 
stochastic cointegrating restriction, which are failed to reject at 5 % significant level. 
Furthermore, in model 3 in case of France and Japan the stochastic cointegrating 
restrictions are rejected at 5 % significant level, however the deterministic cointegrating 
restrictions are failed reject for these countries.  Finally, model 4 shows that almost all 
countries are cointegrated through stochastic cointegrating restrictions except Japan, 
where deterministic cointegration is failed to reject at 5 % significant level. The 
magnitude and the signs of cointegrating vectors of all four models are consistent with 
the economic theories and our expectations.  
ECM and SURECM 
Based on CCR results we estimate the cointegrating vectors for our models under 
the investigation. Now, next step in this study is to investigate short-run and long-run 
dynamics between the financial development and economic growth by running Error 
Correction Model (ECM) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Error Correction Model 
(SURECM) in the system method. Through error correction term, ECM and SURECM 
allow the discovery of Granger Causality relation between the financial development and 
economic growth for twelve OECD countries for models 1 through 4. The estimation 
results of ordinary ECM and SURECM are reported in Tables 1.11 - 1.14.  
 The results of ordinary ECM and SURECM for model 1 are reported in Table 
1.11, which show that we have statistically significant  ̂  for only three countries based 
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on ECM results and six countries based on SURECM. This significant improvement has 
been obtained due to system method, which is more efficient than ordinary methods. 
More specifically, when markets have a close relationship with one another, SURECM 
approach accounts for cross equation correlations among the countries in the system. 
SURECM method utilizes the information in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals 
in the system to improve the efficiency. In addition to running iterative SURECM, we 
have also run the restrictive SURECM by applying the restrictions that all countries have 
same coefficient for speed of adjustment. The restrictive model result shows that   ̂  is 
statistically significant at 5 % level, which is fairly same as we run panel error correction 
model assuming that countries in this sample are homogeneous. The results of restrictive 
SURECM show that we reject the null hypothesis that speed of adjustment coefficients 
are same for all countries. This means that even though OECD countries are 
homogeneous in terms of their economic development, financial system and standards of 
living, but they are not homogeneous, revealing the heterogeneity of countries in this 
study. Also we have run SURECM and restrictive SURECM for sub-group of European 
and non-European countries. However, the results of these SURECM’s didn’t perform 
any better with fewer cases of cointegration and not significant point estimates for speed 
of adjustment in non-restrictive models. These results mainly happened due to selection 
bias issues, because in the European region, these economies trade, interact and 
cointegrated with many more other middle income European countries, members of EU 
and their neighbors, which are not included in this sample and sub-group. However, the 
results of SURECM for financial variables are weakly exogenous for most countries, 
which can be interpreted as LY dominates the short run dynamics.  
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 Furthermore, the ordinary ECM and iterative SURECM results for model 2 is 
reported in Table 1.12. Here, only France and Italy exhibit statistically significant 
estimates for speed of adjustment in regular ECM, saying that there are only two 
countries out of twelve display long run relations between economic growth and the 
financial development, which has been improved significantly after running the same 
model in the system method. The results of iterative SURECM show that seven countries 
such as Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea, have long run 
relationship between finance (expressed as the ratio of domestic credit issued by banks to 
GDP) and growth.  Model 2 differs from model 1 in that it has a different set of control 
variables, which accounts for the role of gross domestic savings instead of role of 
international trade as one of the growth factors. The inclusion of GSY instead of TY as 
one of the control variables improved the results of estimation. The restrictive SURECM 
for model 2 shows that  ̂  was rejected at 5 % level, which indicates the heterogeneity of 
markets. Models 1 and 2 both employ DCBY (the ratio of domestic credit issued by 
banks to GDP) or the degree of dependence upon banking sector as financial proxy. 
However, it’s worth to note that non-restrictive and restrictive SURECM results for sub-
group of European and non-European countries have been improved significantly. These 
improvements show the importance of control variables in model specification. Based on 
recent development of European economies, the widening debt crisis became one of the 
major concerns for economic policy makers and governments. Especially recent default 
of Greece created further concern in the region. Spain, Italy, and Portugal all have 
economic and debt dynamic that somewhat mirror Greece.  Even though these countries 
are not the object of study in this essay, however they do affect entire euro zone and have 
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a hidden effect on seven countries in this essay. Based on this reasoning, selection of 
control variables is very important for European countries case. Especially, the results 
demonstrates that gross domestic savings is one of the influential and important control 
variables to detect the causality relationship in euro zone.  
Finally, ECM and SURECM results for models 3 and 4 are reported in Tables 1.13 
and 1.14. These two models employ LLY (the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP) as 
financial proxy and again using the same sets of control variables as before in models 1 
and 2. LLY is the measure of financial depth or the size of financial intermediation. In 
model 3 the results of ordinary ECM show that Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden 
have long-run relationship between finance and growth, however the results have been 
improved significantly in the system method presenting seven countries such as 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Sweden with statistically 
significant estimates for speed of adjustment coefficient. Similar improvement has been 
shown when we run SURECM for sub-group of countries based on geographical location 
and closeness of economies such as European countries and non-European countries. The 
cross-equation restriction under the hull hypothesis for  ̂  was rejected at 5 % significant 
level, which supports the results of non-restrictive model that countries are not 
homogenous in this study. ECM and SURECM results for model 4, as before have been 
improved by employing system method. We have statistically significant  ̂  for Austria, 
France, Germany and US for ordinary ECM, and for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Korea and US in SURECM. The restrictive SURECM also produced statistically 
significant point estimates for speed of adjustment which was rejected at 1 % level both 
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for European and non-European sub-group, which support the results from previous three 
models.  
Based on above mentioned results of ordinary ECM and SURECM, we can say that 
there are not big differences in our results depending on selection of financial proxy. We 
may conclude that the long run relationship between financial development and economic 
growth are not sensitive to selection of financial variables. However, the link between 
economic growth and financial development might be sensitive to selection of control 
variables to detect the role of other factors affecting the growth. It’s worthwhile to note 
that we have better estimates when GSY is used as one of control variables instead of 
TY. Finally, based on results of SURECM, there is strong evidence that LY dominates 
the short run dynamics due to presence of weak erogeneity issue for all financial 
variables and this is also true for European and non-European sub-groups as well. 
Granger Causality test 
Final test in this study is to test for contemporaneous causality relation between 
financial development and economic growth. Granger causality test based on ordinary 
VAR and Granger causality test based on SURECM methods are employed to test for 
contemporaneous causality and find the direction of causality. The results of VAR and 
system based Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 1.15 – 1.18.  According to 
Granger causality tests for Model 1 in Table 1.15, we found no evidence of causality in 
either direction between total bank credit and economic growth for five countries 
(Belgium, Canada, France, Korea, and Sweden); evidence of two-way causality in three 
countries (Austria, Germany, and UK); evidence of positive causality running from 
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finance to growth in four countries (Australia, Italy, Japan, and the US). The results of 
VAR based Granger causality test of model 1 provide a weak support for the hypothesis 
that Levine and King discussed that financial development ‘leads’ economic growth.  
 The results of VAR based Granger causality test for model 2 provide similar 
evidence as in model 1: we found the evidence of no causality in six countries (Belgium, 
Canada, France, Korea, and Sweden); the evidence of positive causality in four countries 
(Australia, Austria, Japan, and the US); the evidence of reverse causality running from 
economic growth to finance in UK only; and bidirectional causality for Germany only. 
Again these results do not provide sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that 
financial development ‘leads’ productivity growth and, consequently, the economic 
growth. The results of models 1 and 2 are consistent with the earlier empirical literature 
such as Shan and Morris (2002) and Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011), who also examined 
the causality pattern by employing ordinary Granger causality test or panel Granger 
causality test.  
 Tables 1.17 and 1.18 report VAR based Granger causality test results for model 3 
and 4. In model 3 we found the evidence of positive causality in two countries (Australia 
and Japan), reverse causality in three countries (Canada, France and UK), two-way 
causality in Italy and no causality for six countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Korea, 
Sweden and US). We got the similar results for model 4 as well: the evidence of positive 
causality in Japan, reserve causality in four countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, and 
UK), bidirectional causality in Italy and no causality in six countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Korea, Sweden and the US). The results of model 3 and 4 are consistent with 
previous studies where VAR based Granger causality method was employed. These 
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results however are in sharp contrast to those of King and Levine (1993a) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) who applied cross sectional approach and concluded that financial 
development is a necessary precursor of economic growth. Based on the results of these 
four models, we can conclude that: 1) the pattern of causality between the financial 
development and economic growth may be country specific; 2) Granger causality test 
results greatly affected by selection of variables, specifically financial proxy and control 
variables; 3) the direction of causality might be different due to selection of econometric 
methods used to examine the causality itself. Our empirical evidence of VAR based 
Granger causality test is consistent with previous literature, where VAR method was 
employed and contradicts the findings of studies where cross sectional or panel data 
approach were used.  
Next we run Granger causality test based on SURECM method to see if there are 
any improvements in our results if system method is applied. The results of SURECM 
based Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 1.15 - 1.18. In addition to running 
system-based Granger causality test for all countries, we have also run the test in sub-
groups for European and non-European countries. Granger causality test results for all 
four models and two sub-groups of countries have brought interesting empirical evidence, 
which will be discussed below in separate sub-sections.  
 Granger causality test: evidence on DCBY versus LLY case 
According to SURECM based Granger causality tests in Table 1.15 for model 1, 
we found the evidence of positive and bidirectional causality between finance and 
economic growth for all countries except Austria, which displays the evidence of  reverse 
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causality. These results imply that the financial development leads economic growth in 
seven countries (Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, UK and US) and there are 
two-way causality exists in four countries. The empirical evidence of model 1 suggests 
that financial development occurs simultaneously with economic growth and we found 
strong support to hypothesis that finance leads economic growth. The similar results were 
obtained when we run Granger causality test for two sub-groups of countries: European 
and non-European countries. There are 3 cases of positive causality, one case of reverse 
causality and one case of bidirectional causality in European sub-group. For non-
European countries, there are 2 countries with bidirectional causality and the rest 
demonstrate somewhat mixed directions of causality. However, there are still some 
countries with no causality in European sub-group such as Belgium and Italy and in non-
European sub-group such as Korea. The Granger causality test results in these two cases 
might be negatively affected due to decrease in number of equation in the system. 
However, the Granger causality test for all 12 countries provides strong evidence that 
there are some causality exists between the financial development and economic growth, 
more specifically, there are positive and directional causality between finance and 
growth. If we summarize the main findings from model1, there are more cases of 
bidirectional and positive causality between financial development and economic growth.  
In this context, it’s interesting to look at model 3 (table 1.17), which utilizes LLY 
as financial proxy and exactly same set of control variables.  Granger causality test for 
model 3 shows that there are evidence of bidirectional causality in six countries out of 
twelve and somewhat mixed results of reverse, positive and no causality cases in 
remaining six countries such as Italy and Austria have evidence of positive causality, 
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Sweden and UK have evidence of reverse causality, and no causality in two countries, 
Canada and Germany.  Clearly, we can detect a significant improvement over ordinary 
Granger causality test results, where we had seven countries with no causality versus two.  
However, Granger causality test results for European countries exhibit the presence of 
more countries with positive causality then for all countries. Non-European countries 
have very mixed results.  
We can also compare the results of model 2 and 4 since they also use same set of 
control variables, GOVY, GSY and CPI, and different measures of financial 
development. In model 2 for all countries (table 1.16), we have seven countries in the 
sample with positive causality, Austria has evidence of reverse causality and four 
countries with bidirectional causalities such as Canada, Germany, Japan, and Korea. For 
European sub-group majority of countries have evidence of positive causality and 
bidirectional causality, and only Belgium does not have any causality between finance 
and growth. Non-European sub-group also reveals bidirectional causality mainly and 
somewhat mixed results.  The Granger causality results of model 4 shown in table 1.18, 
where there are 7 countries out of 12 have bidirectional causality and the remaining 
countries have either positive or reverse causality. In European sub-group the majority of 
countries have presence of bidirectional and positive causality. However, non-European 
sub-group of countries has reserve and positive causalities.  
If we compare models 1 and 3, and models 2 and 4, there are differ from each 
other only by selection of financial proxy. Model 1 (2) uses DCBY and model 3 (4) uses 
LLY as a measure of financial development. When we use DCBY as financial proxy, 
there is strong tendency of positive and bidirectional causality case. However, we cannot 
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precisely say this conclusion about LLY. Model 3 and 4 show the evidence of 
bidirectional causality in most of the cases.  
 Granger Causality test: evidence on TY versus GSY 
In this context, we can compare models 1 and 2, and models 3 and 4, because 
models 1(3) and 2(4) use same financial proxy; however they have a different set of 
control variables. Test results of model 1 provide stronger evidence of positive causality 
in seven countries and bidirectional causality in four countries. In European sub-group 2 
countries with positive and 2 countries with reverse causality. However in non-European 
sub-group the results are mixed. But in model 2, when use GSY instead of TY, there are 
more cases of bidirectional and positive causalities observed than in model 1. European 
countries have a strong evidence of positive and directional causalities than in model 1 as 
well.  Similarly, we can compare models 3 and 4, where LLY is used as financial proxy 
and different set of control variables. The result of this analysis shows that when GSY 
used as control variable instead of TY, we have more cases of bidirectional causality. So 
the sensitivity analysis shows that selection of control variables is important among 
similar income groups. In case of high income OECD countries as well as European 
countries, GSY is one of the key control variables to correctly detect the direction of 
causality relationship between financial development and economic growth due to euro 
zone recent economic problems related to debt crisis of its member countries.  
Finally, there are significant improvements in Granger causality test results after 
running SURECM, which highlights that system method is superior to the conventional 
regression methods. SURECM based Granger causality test reveals the evidence of 
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bidirectional causality and the fact that direction of causality may be country specific. We 
can conclude that the system method in this study clearly provides a better estimates for 
 ̂ , which in return also improves Granger causality test results because the system 
method accounts for cross equation correlations among countries and utilizes information 
in the variance-covariance matrix of residual to improve the efficiency of statistical 
estimates. 
I.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In order to investigate the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth and study the effectiveness of financial development in OECD 
countries economic growth, we have employed Johansen-Juselius cointegration test, 
Park’s CCR, ordinary ECM, SURECM and Granger causality in the system method. The 
essay present further evidence concerning the debate over whether financial development 
leads economic growth in a Granger causality sense among high income OECD 
countries. 
We mentioned earlier that there are conflicting theoretical as well as empirical 
arguments regarding the role and importance of financial development. Based on the 
results of ECM, SURECM and Granger causality test, we found the evidence of 
bidirectional and positive causality running from finance to economic growth, which is 
consistent with conclusions of Demetriades and Luintel (1996), Arestis and Demetriades 
(1997), Shan, Morris and Sun (2001) conclusions. So the conclusion of Granger causality 
test is consistent with earlier literature that the direction of causality may be country 
specific. This suggests that financial development is not necessarily a leading sector to 
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generate growth. However, it’s essential to mention the importance of it both 
theoretically and for economic policy considerations.  
The study also found that the selection of financial and control variables are 
important to accurately examine the pattern of causality. The empirical results of Granger 
causality test suggest that bank credit (DCBY) and the financial depth (LLY) variables 
perform well to study the causality relationship. On the other hand, evidence shows that 
trade is not as important factor of growth as gross domestic savings for high income 
OECD countries, especially for euro zone area. Another important conclusion of this 
study is that the selection of econometric techniques does play an important role in 
examining the causality pattern. We employed Park’s CCR to estimate cointegrating 
vectors and run SURECM and Granger causality test in the system method, which 
significantly improves the power of the test and provides more accurate information on 
directions of causality. 
However, one-way causality results are greatly affected by selection of financial 
proxy. Positive causality between financial development and economic growth has been 
mainly observed when DCBY (the share of domestic credit issued by banks to GDP) is 
used as a measure of financial development and reverse causality relationship, when LLY 
(the share of liquid liability to GDP) is used as a financial proxy. The main findings in 
these essays show a little evidence that financial development is a necessary and 
sufficient precondition to economic growth. Also the sensitivity analysis has been done 
by studying the countries based on geographical region such as European and non-
European countries. The main reason to divide countries in to two groups is based on 
reasoning that even though our sample contains homogeneous countries in terms of 
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income levels and standards of living, however, they are heterogeneous in terms of 
cultural background, trade barriers, distance to borders, history, membership in European 
Union and geographical location. In order to remove the heterogeneity issue the sample 
size has been divided into two sub-groups such as European and non-European countries. 
Our findings illustrate that European countries have statistically significant point 
estimates of speed of adjustment coefficients, which show the stronger evidence of 
cointegration in the region among the high income countries. Another important 
contribution of this essay is the econometric method used to examine the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. Previous research employed 
traditional OLS, cross-sectional study or panel cointegration test to examine the causality 
relationship. However, this is the first attempt in this field to study this relationship using 
system method. The findings demonstrate that the system method is superior to single 
equation approach. 
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Table 1.7 Park's CCR test results
MODEL 1 LY = f(DCBY, TY, GOVY, CPI)
DCBY TY GOVY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
Australia 0.006 -0.022 0.018 0.001 6.743 0.165 5.456
(0.001) (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) (0.009) (0.685) (0.065)
Austria 0.008 0.022 0.006 0.006 3.363 0.005 0.626
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.067) (0.942) (0.731)
Belgium 0.002 0.004 0.009 -0.013 15.300 1.933 2.146
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.164) (0.342)
Canada 0.004 -0.026 0.010 -0.008 1.077 0.237 4.002
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.299) (0.626) (0.135)
France -0.002 -0.028 0.025 -0.026 1.739 0.999 1.007
(0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.187) (0.318) (0.605)
Germany 0.008 0.019 0.005 0.004 5.140 0.330 13.904
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.023) (0.566) (0.001)
Italy 0.009 -0.085 0.012 -0.010 0.889 0.013 0.732
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.346) (0.908) (0.693)
Japan 0.005 0.014 0.005 -0.008 0.451 4.823 7.011
(0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.502) (0.028) (0.030)
Korea 0.029 0.064 -0.007 0.007 5.456 0.072 0.519
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.020) (0.788) (0.771)
Sweden 0.0049 0.004 0.014 -0.013 3.423 0.888 1.136
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.064) (0.346) (0.567)
UK 0.003 -0.061 0.017 0.002 0.002 5.477 6.531
(0.000) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.969) (0.019) (0.038)
US 0.002 -0.030 0.046 -0.014 1.481 0.043 0.156
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.224) (0.835) (0.925)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; 
LLY: liquid liabilities/GDP;TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP;
GSY: gross savings/GDP; CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
β (a)
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Table 1.8 Park's CCR test results
MODEL 2 LY = f(DCBY, GOVY, GSY, CPI) 
DCBY GOVY GSY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
Australia 0.007 0.019 0.044 -0.006 3.357 0.306 2.322
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.067) (0.580) (0.313)
Austria 0.011 0.004 -0.053 0.011 2.143 2.813 6.270
(0.001) (0.001) 0.0099 (0.005) (0.143) (0.094) (0.043)
Belgium 0.002 0.007 0.006 -0.014 12.205 0.456 0.501
(0.000) (0.001) (0.008) 0(.004) (0.000) (0.499) (0.778)
Canada 0.003 0.013 0.054 -0.021 5.707 1.552 4.170
(0.000) (0.002) (0.012) (0.005) (0.017) (0.213) (0.124)
France -0.002 0.022 0.048 -0.023 0.009 1.810 4.937
(0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.926) (0.178) (0.085)
Germany 0.007 0.005 -0.019 -0.001 2.007 1.255 15.341
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.157) (0.263) (0.000)
Italy -0.004 0.018 0.071 -0.017 13.173 2.676 2.758
(0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.000) (0.102) (0.252)
Japan 0.006 -0.001 -0.028 0.200 1.618 2.277 2.345
(0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.203) (0.131) (0.310)
Korea 0.016 -0.002 0.253 -0.049 22.134 3.464 4.544
(0.005) (0.006) (0.074) (0.009) (0.000) (0.063) (0.103)
Sweden 0.004 0.012 0.004 -0.017 1.888 2.135 2.215
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.169) (0.144) (0.330)
UK 0.005 0.014 0.022 -0.007 8.360 0.176 2.470
(0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.675) (0.291)
US 0.005 0.049 0.069 -0.006 5.325 0.898 1.198
(0.001) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009) (0.021) (0.343) (0.549)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; 
LLY: liquid liabilities/GDP;TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP;
GSY: gross savings/GDP; CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
the H(1, q) statistic tests the stochastic cointegration.
* countries with no cointegration
β (a)
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Table 1.9 Park's CCR test results
MODEL 3 LY = f(LLY, TY, GOVY, CPI)
LLY TY GOVY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
Australia 0.019 -0.026 0.010 0.005 16.198 2.055 2.266
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.152) (0.322)
Austria 0.013 -0.018 0.009 -0.090 6.810 0.100 1.248
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.009) (1.751) (0.536)
Belgium 0.010 -0.001 0.005 -0.023 24.406 2.824 5.216
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.093) (0.074)
Canada 0.030 0.006 0.002 -0.025 12.367 0.213 2.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.645) (0.367)
France 0.000 -0.005 0.032 -0.031 0.841 5.823 5.966
(0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.359) (0.016) (0.051)
Germany 0.009 -0.083 -0.043 -0.178 6.729 2.227 2.285
(0.001) (0.017) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.136) (0.319)
Italy -0.003 -0.054 0.015 -0.006 8.565 0.000 2.488
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.996) (0.288)
Japan 0.009 0.019 0.001 -0.006 0.369 7.251 13.984
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.543) (0.007) (0.001)
Korea 0.015 0.026 0.006 -0.007 5.009 0.145 7.669
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.025) (0.704) (0.022)
Sweden -0.002 0.011 0.014 -0.030 6.818 2.044 7.686
(0.008) (0.023) (0.016) (0.037) (0.009) (0.153) (0.021)
UK 0.005 -0.027 0.015 -0.007 47.594 0.026 0.789
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.872) (0.674)
US 0.008 -0.016 0.068 -0.034 2.728 0.271 4.931
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.099) (0.602) (0.085)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; 
LLY: liquid liabilities/GDP;TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP;
GSY: gross savings/GDP; CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
the H(1, q) statistic tests the stochastic cointegration.
* countries with no cointegration
β (a)
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Table 1.10  Park's CCR test results
MODEL 4 LY = f(LLY, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
LLY GOVY GSY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
Australia 0.022 0.009 0.048 -0.005 11.810 1.331 1.333
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.249) (0.514)
Austria 0.013 0.008 0.049 -0.072 6.094 0.002 2.722
(0.008) (0.003) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.967) (0.256)
Belgium 0.008 0.005 0.010 -0.029 19.835 1.414 6.247
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.234) (0.044)
Canada 0.028 0.001 -0.021 -0.025 9.045 0.352 0.598
(0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.553) (0.742)
France 0.000 0.023 0.032 -0.028 0.185 1.724 2.701
(0.000) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.667) (0.189) (0.259)
Germany -0.001 0.090 0.166 -0.025 18.922 0.453 1.874
(0.003) (0.027) (0.032) (0.045) (0.000) (0.501) (0.392)
Italy -0.004 0.018 0.072 -0.006 2.945 0.151 0.556
(0.000) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.086) (0.698) (0.757)
Japan 0.008 -0.002 -0.037 -0.006 0.804 8.092 10.050
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.370) (0.004) (0.007)
Korea 0.014 -0.012 0.201 0.013 13.296 0.003 7.295
(0.001) (0.004) (0.046) (0.006) (0.000) (0.955) (0.026)
Sweden -0.007 0.001 0.002 -0.003 1.012 0.557 2.553
(0.009) (0.011) (0.028) (0.012) (0.314) (0.456) (0.279)
UK 0.006 0.016 -0.001 -0.011 0.118 1.080 2.522
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.731) (0.299) (0.283)
US 0.008 0.075 0.019 -0.045 0.009 1.317 3.199
(0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.924) (0.251) (0.202)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; 
LLY: liquid liabilities/GDP;TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP;
GSY: gross savings/GDP; CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
the H(1, q) statistic tests the stochastic cointegration.
* countries with no cointegration
β (a)
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Table 1.11  ECM and SURECM Results
MODEL 1 LY = f(DCBY, TY, GOVY, CPI)
countries
REGULAR 
ECM: a) ALL b) EUROPE c) NON-EUROPE
Australia LY 0.005 (0.010) -0.015 (0.008) * 0.002 (0.010)
DCBY 5.378 (2.590) 7.603 (1.837) 4.655 (2.029)
Austria LY 0.029 (0.026) 0.006 (0.011) 0.015 (0.016)
DCBY -4.713 (4.941) -5.296 (3.324) -5.056 (3.731)
Belgium LY -0.018 (0.036) -0.024 (0.024) -0.026 (0.031)
DCBY 46.623 (54.372) 63.275 (37.434) 130.372 (38.171)
Canada LY -0.003 (0.007) -0.017 (0.004) *** 0.001 (0.007)
DCBY 14.336 (6.548) 17.438 (4.740) 9.737 (5.797)
France LY -0.030 (0.013) ** -0.010 (0.005) * -0.010 (0.006)
DCBY -0.209 (12.675) -2.614 (11.839) 2.360 (11.864)
Germany LY 0.015 (0.012) 0.030 (0.013) 0.041 (0.014)
DCBY 11.342 (4.282) 15.322 (3.038) 17.817 (2.852)
Italy LY -0.013 (0.005) ** -0.004 (0.003) -0.009 (0.004) **
DCBY 1.807 (1.264) 1.571 (1.109) 1.276 (1.150)
Japan LY -0.060 (0.029) ** -0.055 (0.031) * -0.087 (0.038) **
DCBY 12.460 (22.859) 1.099 (14.936) 7.211 (15.164)
Korea LY 0.007 (0.010) -0.020 (0.005) *** -0.008 (0.008)
DCBY 0.681 (0.996) 1.622 (0.845) 1.519 (0.921)
Sweden LY -0.015 (0.024) -0.017 (0.016) -0.005 (0.019)
DCBY 53.838 (25.761) 46.364 (19.710) 67.578 (22.405)
UK LY 0.018 (0.010) 0.004 (0.007) 0.023 (0.009)
DCBY 0.168 (6.087) -0.859 (4.751) 0.120 (4.858)
US LY -0.012 (0.010) -0.011 (0.006) * -0.002 (0.008)
DCBY 6.267 (3.676) 9.235 (2.647) 10.536 (2.895)
with restrictions LY -0.004 (0.002) ** -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.005)
DCBY 4.169 (0.629) 2.810 (0.940) 2.714 (0.846)
chi2 (p-value) LY 65.090 (0.000) 25.170 (0.000) 7.770 (0.101)
DCBY 36.250 (0.000) 37.940 (0.000) 12.530 (0.014)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
λ:
SURECM:
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Table 1.12  ECM and SURECM Results
MODEL 2 LY = f(DCBY, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
countries
REGULAR 
ECM: a) ALL b) EUROPE c) NON-EUROPE
Australia LY 0.001 (0.010) -0.006 (0.007) 0.003 (0.009)
DCBY 3.340 (2.208) 2.573 (1.912) 4.777 (2.066)
Austria LY -0.009 (0.022) 0.005 (0.005) -0.006 (0.007)
DCBY 1.236 (2.611) -1.245 (1.433) 0.340 (1.805)
Belgium LY -0.039 (0.036) -0.035 (0.015) ** -0.022 (0.020)
DCBY 18.195 (30.388) 28.092 (22.911) 15.839 (23.335)
Canada LY -0.031 (0.021) -0.016 (0.009) * -0.016 (0.014)
DCBY 17.351 (13.965) 40.773 (9.810) 28.745 (12.758)
France LY -0.046 (0.016) *** -0.019 (0.006) *** -0.021 (0.008) ***
DCBY -10.699 (20.554) -8.870 (17.536) -19.899 (19.028)
Germany LY -0.001 (0.043) -0.03 (0.010) *** -0.025 (0.012) **
DCBY 11.951 (6.398) 8.713 (3.370) 13.773 (4.218)
Italy LY -0.064 (0.018) *** -0.041 (0.006) *** -0.042 (0.009) ***
DCBY 8.817 (4.294) 11.311 (2.608) 7.477 (3.059)
Japan LY -0.011 (0.007) -0.023 (0.003) *** -0.014 (0.004) ***
DCBY -2.407 (2.868) -3.465 (1.811) -1.840 (2.056)
Korea LY 0.001 (0.005) -0.006 (0.003) ** -0.000 (0.004)
DCBY -0.227 (0.492) -0.392 (0.368) -0.238 (0.461)
Sweden LY 0.001 (0.024) 0.038 (0.012) 0.020 (0.015)
DCBY 31.067 (21.365) 53.469 (15.287) 48.665 (19.556)
UK LY 0.059 (0.050) 0.12 (0.019) 0.087 (0.033)
DCBY 39.011 (18.713) 50.219 (13.790) 57.525 (14.232)
US LY -0.015 (0.015) -0.007 (0.007) 0.004 (0.010)
DCBY 10.517 (4.236) 11.85 (2.872) 12.175 (3.276)
with restrictions LY -0.009 (0.001) *** -0.017 (0.004) *** -0.007 (0.003) ***
DCBY 0.358 (0.329) 5.156 (1.494) 0.228 (0.437)
chi2 (p-value) LY 131.150 (0.000) 24.210 (0.001) 10.940 (0.027)
DCBY 77.910 (0.000) 26.360 (0.000) 19.090 (0.001)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
λ:
SURECM:
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Table 1.13  ECM and SURECM Results
MODEL 3 LY = f(LLY, TY, GOVY, CPI)
countries
REGULAR 
ECM: a) ALL b) EUROPE c) NON-EUROPE
Australia LY 0.001 (0.014) -0.014 (0.009) * 0.005 (0.008)
DCBY 2.959 (0.723) 2.928 (0.428) 2.699 (0.507)
Austria LY -0.024 (0.015) -0.006 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007)
DCBY 5.706 (2.195) 7.477 (0.779) 6.144 (1.045)
Belgium LY -0.055 (0.030) * -0.014 (0.016) -0.008 (0.019)
DCBY 12.679 (7.018) 24.405 (2.537) 11.795 (4.018)
Canada LY -0.040 (0.050) -0.039 (0.019) ** -0.101 (0.024) ***
DCBY 6.599 (3.324) 11.094 (1.309) 4.825 (1.354)
France LY -0.037 (0.027) -0.029 (0.011) ** -0.022 (0.012) *
DCBY -11.672 (63.547) -39.907 (20.381) -43.260 (29.755)
Germany LY -0.024 (0.011) ** -0.011 (0.005) ** -0.011 (0.006) *
DCBY -3.733 (7.369) -0.627 (1.908) -4.384 (2.288)
Italy LY -0.024 (0.010) ** -0.005 (0.004) -0.017 (0.005) ***
DCBY 8.202 (3.767) 13.574 (1.816) 4.405 (2.319)
Japan LY -0.071 (0.047) -0.046 (0.024) * -0.06 (0.028) **
DCBY 8.005 (6.988) 15.162 (3.327) 11.999 (4.787)
Korea LY -0.035 (0.023) -0.041 (0.014) *** -0.028 (0.016) *
DCBY 8.255 (3.051) 7.827 (1.041) 11.323 (2.495)
Sweden LY -0.137 (0.037) *** -0.073 (0.021) *** -0.058 (0.023) **
DCBY 2.173 (4.204) 1.315 (2.585) 2.275 (3.444)
UK LY 0.022 (0.016) 0.022 (0.013) 0.021 (0.017)
DCBY 7.711 (6.890) 19.911 (4.672) 12.613 (5.343)
US LY -0.007 (0.010) 0.011 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006)
DCBY 0.678 (0.587) -0.048 (0.339) 0.965 (0.374)
with restrictions LY -0.005 (0.002) ** -0.012 (0.004) *** -0.009 (0.003) ***
DCBY 3.153 (0.224) 4.359 (0.822) 1.856 (0.208)
chi2 (p-value) LY 36.880 (0.000) 77.990 (0.000) 17.920 (0.001)
DCBY 161.890 (0.000) 36.820 (0.000) 58.410 (0.000)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
λ:
 SURECM:
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Table 1.14  ECM and SURECM Results
MODEL 4 LY = f(LLY, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
countries
REGULAR 
ECM: a) ALL b) EUROPE c) NON-EUROPE
Australia LY 0.009 (0.013) -0.007 (0.008) 0.001 (0.011) ***
DCBY 3.272 (0.888) 3.097 (0.599) 3.367 (0.726)
Austria LY -0.116 (0.042) ** 0.001 (0.000) -0.008 (0.013)
DCBY 11.78 (3.564) 6.906 (1.475) 5.241 (1.500)
Belgium LY -0.040 (0.032) -0.024 (0.014) * -0.018 (0.019)
DCBY 12.993 (10.110) 21.194 (2.149) 11.737 (3.758)
Canada LY 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.000) -0.046 (0.020) **
DCBY 3.608 (2.300) 4.371 (0.846) 1.328 (1.188)
France LY -0.059 (0.021) *** -0.040 (0.012) *** -0.029 (0.014) **
DCBY -4.688 (65.909) -48.46 (22.096) -116.804 (27.377)
Germany LY -0.04 (0.013) *** -0.041 (0.004) *** -0.037 (0.006) ***
DCBY 10.576 (10.235) 10.491 (2.021) 6.391 (2.135)
Italy LY -0.039 (0.014) ** -0.040 (0.006) *** -0.051 (0.010) ***
DCBY 5.451 (7.589) 9.613 (2.935) 12.466 (3.032)
Japan LY 0.043 (0.043) 0.000 (0.000) -0.088 (0.024) ***
DCBY 13.472 (5.543) 6.04 (2.705) 6.472 (3.914)
Korea LY 0.006 (0.010) -0.009 (0.003) *** 0.004 (0.006)
DCBY -0.562 (1.190) -0.028 (0.306) 1.115 (0.988)
Sweden LY 0.001 (0.013) 0.014 (0.013) 0.002 (0.015)
DCBY 4.798 (2.101) 4.792 (1.164) 5.833 (1.553)
UK LY -0.033 (0.026) 0.001 (0.000) -0.002 (0.039)
DCBY 36.278 (15.041) 24.355 (5.823) 32.17 (8.477)
US LY -0.068 (0.038) * -0.017 (0.006) *** -0.014 (0.007) *
DCBY 0.614 (0.653) 1.084 (0.488) 0.792 (0.518)
with restrictions LY -0.007 (0.001) *** -0.037 (0.006) *** -0.006 (0.004)
DCBY -0.000 (0.011) 4.707 (0.886) 1.884 (0.335)
chi2 (p-value) LY 383.150 (0.000) 20.340 (0.002) 11.180 (0.025)
DCBY 39.790 (0.001) 52.800 (0.000) 9.280 (0.055)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
ESSAY 2: FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR 
ASIAN ECONOMIES: A SYSTEM APPROACH  
Abstract 
In this essay I investigate the long run relationship between financial development and 
economic growth for 16 Asian economies with different levels of income in most 
efficient manner via system method. In addition, we employ Parks CCR test to estimate 
cointegrating vectors and run ordinary ECM as well as SURECM. Based on the results of 
Granger causality test in system method, I found: 1) strong evidence that causality exists 
between the financial development and economic growth, more specifically, direction of 
causality is bidirectional in most of the cases; 2) an evidence of positive causality running 
from finance to growth when DCBY is used as financial proxy, which highlights the 
importance of bank loan to promote investment and economic growth; and 3) a tendency 
of reverse causality running from growth to finance when BM is used as financial proxy, 
pointing out to the important role of formal bank intermediation for economic growth; 4) 
cases of one-way causality such as positive and reverse causality are more prominent for 
middle to low income countries; 5) an evidence that China has a huge impact on Asian 
economy and more precisely it has a significant impact on developing economies such as 
middle and low income countries; 6) selection of control variables does not affect the 
71 
model specification and the direction of causality; and 7) system method is superior to 
traditional regression methods. These results are consistent with earlier literature in that 
the direction of causality may be country specific. However, it does not support King and 
Levine’s (1993a) conclusion that finance is a leading sector to economic growth. The 
question might give some further guidance as to whether a well-developed financial 
sector is a necessary condition for a higher growth rates for developing countries and 
provide an important policy implication both for OECD countries as well as for countries 
that have financial sectors that are comparatively underdeveloped. 
 
Keywords: Financial development, economic growth, causality, cointegration, VECM, 
CCR, SURECM 
 
JEL Classifications: C22, C23, O16, G18, G28 
INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this essay is to investigate the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth and study the effectiveness of financial development 
on economic growth for 16 Asian economies by using system approach. In conducting 
this study, Johansen-Juselius (1991) cointegration test, Park’s (1992) Canonical 
Cointegrating Regression (CCR), Error Correction Model (ECM), as well as Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Error Correction Model (SURECM) and Granger (1969) causality 
tests in a system method are used as empirical evidence. The study will present further 
evidence concerning the debate over whether financial development leads economic 
growth in a Granger causality sense among high income, middle income and low income 
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countries from Asian region. The main contribution of this study is to examine the long 
run dynamics and causality between financial development and economic growth in 
multivariate SURECM setting for countries under the investigation. SURECM and 
Granger causality test will provide further evidence on relationship between the financial 
development and economic growth, because the system method in this study accounts for 
cross equation correlations among countries and utilizes information in the variance-
covariance matrix of residual to improve the efficiency of statistical estimates. There are 
conflicting theoretical as well as empirical arguments regarding the role and importance 
of financial development. The empirical results of this study clearly supports the 
hypothesis that there are bidirectional relationships exists between financial development 
and economic growth.  
Based on the results of Granger causality test in system method, I found: 1) strong 
evidence that causality exists between the financial development and economic growth, 
more specifically, direction of causality is bidirectional in most of the cases; 2) an 
evidence of positive causality running from finance to growth when we use DCBY as 
financial proxy, which highlights the importance of bank loan to promote investment and 
economic growth; and 3) a tendency of reverse causality running from growth to finance 
when BM is used as financial proxy, pointing out to the important role of formal bank 
intermediation for economic growth; 4) cases of one-way causality such as positive and 
reverse causality are more prominent for middle to low income countries.; 5) an evidence 
that China has a huge impact on Asian economy and more precisely it has a significant 
impact on developing economies such as middle and low income countries; and 6) 
selection of control variables does not affect the model specification and the direction of 
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causality. These results are consistent with conclusions of Demetriades and Luintel 
(1996), Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Shan, Morris and Sun (2001) conclusions. The 
main findings of this study show little evidence that financial development is a necessary 
and sufficient precondition to economic growth.  
Furthermore, findings suggest that the selection of econometric method used to 
examine the relationship between financial development and economic growth is very 
important. The findings clearly demonstrate that the directions of causality vary across 
countries and emphasis that the system method is superior to single equation approach. 
The question might give some further guidance as to whether a well-developed financial 
sector is a necessary and sufficient condition for a higher growth rates for developing 
countries and provide an important policy implication both for OECD countries as well 
as for countries that have financial sectors that are comparatively underdeveloped.  
The question of causality is a long-standing issue and brings up all kinds of 
controversies. However, it’s very important for economists and policy makers to be able 
to use estimated models for policy purposes. This essay is organized as follows. Section 1 
discusses the literature review. Section 2 describes the data, model and methodology used 
to conduct this study. Section 3 discusses empirical results and finally section 4 discusses 
summary and conclusion. 
II.1. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theoretical literature 
This essay examines the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth using time series data for 16 Asian economies with different income 
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levels such as high income, middle income and low income countries. The topic has been 
comprehensively studied in the theoretical and empirical literature. The theoretical 
foundation of this relationship can be traced back to the work of Shumpeter (1911) and 
later Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Economists hold 
controversial opinions regarding the role of financial system for economic growth. Based 
on Levine (2005), financial systems facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying, and 
pooling of risk, allocate resources, monitor managers and exert corporate control, 
mobilize savings, and facilitate the exchange of goods and services. Every single 
functions of financial system can affect national savings and investment decision. 
Basically there are three main opposing theoretical views on the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. Joseph Shumpeter argues that “well-
functioning banks spur technological innovation by identifying and funding those 
entrepreneurs with best chances of successfully implementing innovative products and 
production processes”. An important part of his discussion is that financial intermediaries 
make possible technological innovation and economic development. McKinnon and 
Shaw discussed that government repression of financial system through interest rate 
ceilings and directed credit slows down financial development, which they claim is 
critical for economic growth. Thus they argue that a more liberalized financial system 
will induce savings and investment, which in return promotes economic growth. So 
called “Goldsmith-McKinnon-Shaw” hypothesis claims that financial liberalization in the 
form of an appropriate rate of return on real cash balances is a vehicle of promoting 
economic growth. 
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The endogenous growth literature also talks about the importance of financial 
development for long-run economic growth through impact of financial sector services 
on capital accumulation and technological innovation.  Famous economists such as 
Robinson (1952), Kuznets (1955) and Lucas (1988), argue that the role of financial sector 
is overstated or that financial development follows expansion of the real sectors of the 
economy. For example, Robinson writes that “where enterprise leads, finance follows” – 
it is economic development which creates the demand for financial services.  Lucas 
(1988) expressed that the role of financial development is “over-stressed”. According to 
Lucas, “there is no one pattern of growth to which all economies conform”, thus he 
pointed out that too much attention has given to role of financial development to 
economic growth. These arguments indicate endogenous growth theorists’ view that 
causality runs from growth to financial development, which is in contrast to McKinnon 
and Shaw hypothesis.  
Recent theorists argue that there is a two-way relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. Among them, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
discuss a model in which both financial sector and economic growth are endogenously 
determined. The model shows bidirectional causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth.  
Previous empirical research for high-, middle- and low income countries 
Most of the recent literature examined the causality between the financial 
development and economic growth from the empirical perspective. Many researchers 
studied the direction of causality and the role of financial development on individual 
country cases such as Australia, China, Egypt, India, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
76 
Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Taiwan. Wide array of previous empirical research has been 
discussed in first essay. However, in this essay main emphasis is given to studies, which 
examined relationship between financial development and economic growth for high 
income countries as well as developing countries with middle to low income cases. Since 
the main purpose of this essay is to study the causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth of group of Asian economies, more specifically with 
different income levels.  
Shan, Morris and Sun (2001) estimated a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model for 
nine OECD countries and China. Their found bidirectional causality between financial 
development and economic growth in half of the countries, and reverse causality in three 
countries, and no evidence of one-way causality. They got a little support that financial 
development leads to economic growth. Based on these results they suggested that 
“financial sector is not a leading sector in the course of economic growth”. Shan and 
Morris (2002) investigated the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth for 19 OECD countries and China. In investigating causality between financial 
development and economic growth, when they used total credit as financial proxy, they 
found evidence of no causality for 10 countries, bidirectional causality for 4 countries, 
one-way causality from finance to growth for 2 countries, and reverse causality for 4 
countries. They found the similar evidence even when they employed the financial 
efficiency (or the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP) to measure the financial development: 
10 countries with no causality, 6 countries with bidirectional causality, 2 countries with 
one-way causality running from finance to economic growth, and 2 countries with 
reverse causality running from economic growth to finance. The empirical evidence gives 
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little support to the hypothesis that financial development “leads” economic growth and 
supports the conclusions of Arestis and Demetriades (1997) and Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996) that the link between financial development and economic growth may be 
country specific and might be affected by differences in industrial structures and cultures 
of countries under the investigation.  They suggested that the financial development is a 
not necessary and sufficient precondition to economic growth.  
Patrick (1966) discusses two alternative hypothesis of the possible causal 
relationship between financial development and economic growth in developing 
countries such as supply-leading and demand-following. Increases in the supply of 
financial services leads to real economic growth and the causal relationship runs from 
finance to growth and it’s known as supply-leading causality. In contrast, as the real 
economy grows, an increasing demand for financial services induces the expansion of the 
financial sector is demand-following causality. He also suggests further hypothesis 
known as stages of development hypothesis, which says that the direction of causality 
between financial development and economic growth changes during the stages of 
development. For example, in the early stages of development supply-leading spur 
promotes real investment and growth. However, as financial development and economic 
growth take place, supply-leading impetus becomes less important and demand-following 
response becomes more dominant. He also points out about the possibility of 
bidirectional causality between financial development and economic growth at this stage. 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) performed the causality tests for 16 developing 
countries and found bidirectional causality in 8 countries and reverse causality in 8 
countries. They came to conclusion that “causality patterns vary across countries and, 
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therefore, highlights the dangers of statistical inference based on cross-section country 
studies which implicitly treat different countries as homogeneous entities”.  
Luintel and Khan (1999) studied the long-run relationship between financial 
development and economic growth by employing multivariate vector autoregression 
(VAR) method using the data of 10 developing countries. They found the evidence of 
only bidirectional causality for all countries, which was distinct from all previous studies. 
Al-Yousif (2002) examined the nature and direction of causality between the 
financial development and economic growth using both time-series and panel data from 
30 developing countries for the period of 1970-1999. His findings strongly support the 
view that financial development and economic growth are “mutually causal” or there is 
bidirectional causality. However, he found some support of positive and reverse causality 
between the finance and economic growth, and as well as for the view that there is no 
relationship, but these findings were not strong as with bidirectional causality.  Clearly, 
the empirical results of Al-Yousif’s paper were in line with other empirical studies that 
“the relationship between financial development and economic growth cannot be 
generalized across countries because economic policies are country specific and their 
success depends, among other things, on the efficiency of the institutions implementing 
them”. All these results show there is no agreement on the role of financial development 
in the process of economic growth. 
Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) examined the long run relationship between the 
financial development and economic growth by using panel unit root test and panel 
cointegration analysis for 10 developing countries. The results suggest that there is a 
strong evidence of long run causality from financial development to growth and no 
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evidence of bidirectional causality between financial deepening and output, pointing that 
the effect is necessary long-run in nature. So they have concluded that “policies aiming at 
improving financial markets will have a delayed effect on growth, but this effect is 
significant’. 
II.2. METHODOLOGY 
II.2.1. Data 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the causal relationship between 
financial development and economic growth by using time series data for 16 Asian 
economies with high-, middle, and low-income levels such as Australia, Bangladesh, 
China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand over the period of 1980-
2010. The sample periods covering 1980 through 2010 are the periods of development of 
financial institutions and financial liberalization in many countries in Asian region. This 
period can also be characterized as periods of rapid economic growth of Asian tigers, 
output expansion, money growth, trade and investment increase, and globalization. 
However, the recent Asian crisis, which has slowed the growth and in some countries 
negative growth has been observed, may have created a new topic of discussion. It’s now 
recognized that the Asian “melt-down” was partially results of excessive financial 
liberalization in those countries. Demirgue-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) discuss that 
financial liberalization was so extensive that financial regulations were unable to prevent 
the collapse, especially where institutions are weak. In addition to this, China, one of the 
largest producer and exporter, has been included in this study to examine the role of 
Chinese economy in the regional economy. Even though, countries in this study are from 
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same geographic region, but the pattern of economic growth and financial development 
appear to differ over time and across countries. The data set of selected Asian countries 
represents the homogeneity of countries within the region and heterogeneity of cross-
countries and income groups. The data frequency used in this study is annual. All the data 
are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2011 (WDI) database 
except the data on broad money, which was obtained from International Monetary Fund 
International Finance Statistics (2011).  
Indicators to measure the Economic Growth and Financial Development 
The selection of variables in this model is based on the theoretical as well as 
empirical framework of previous studies. One of the important issues in this study is the 
selection of proxies to measure financial development and economic growth. For 
economic development, the natural logarithm of real GDP (LY) is used to measure 
economic growth and the main reason of using natural logarithm is based on the 
econometrics method employed in this study to examine the direction of causality in 
Granger sense based on SURECM. Levine and Zervos (1998) and Arestis, Demetriades, 
and Luintel (2001) suggested that even though both banks and stock markets could 
promote the economic growth, the effects of banks are far more significant. Following 
this conclusion, bank-based measures of financial development variables are used in this 
study rather than stock market-based financial structures.  
There is not a single empirical definition of bank-based financial development 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)). Previous studies have used various 
indicators to measure financial development. Following King and Levine (1993a), Levine 
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and Zervos (1998), and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009), and the standard 
literature, two different measures of financial proxy are used.  First proxy is domestic 
credit to private sector provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP (DCBY) 
following Levine and Zervos (1998).  Higher DCBY indicates higher degree of 
dependence upon banking sector for financing and this measure of financial development 
is often argued to be best measure of financial development, which measures the extent 
of efficient resource allocation by private sector.  Second alternative measure of financial 
development, developed by King and Levine (1993a)), is the ratio of M2 to GDP (BM) to 
measure the broad money in the economy, which is the sum of currency, demand and 
interest bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. 
This is very popular and widely used indicator to measure the size of the financial 
intermediation.  Higher ratio of broad money to GDP indicates the higher intensity of the 
banking system and financial intermediation. Another measure of financial development 
based on King and Levine (1993a), is the domestic credit to private sector issued by 
banks and other non-banks as a percentage of GDP (DCPSY). A high ratio of domestic 
credit to private sector to GDP shows a higher level of domestic investment, which 
results in higher output. The regression and Granger causality test results using DCPSY 
are not reported in this essay, however can be viewed at request from the authors. 
Indicators to measure the real sector or control variables  
It’s clear that factors other than financial development have an impact on 
economic growth. Following the recent literature on the analysis of financial 
development and economic growth, four other variables are used to control for other 
factor associated with economic growth. The third indicator used in this research is the 
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ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP (GSY), which indicates the intensity of the 
financial intermediaries implying that more financial services generate more financial 
development. Based on economic theory, higher gross domestic savings generates higher 
investment and hence higher economic growth. Fourth indicator is the ratio of trade to 
GDP (TY), which measures the size of real sector and trade policy. Fifth indicator is the 
ratio of government final consumption expenditures to GDP (GOVY) to measure the 
weight of fiscal policy. Sixth indicator is inflation rate (CPI), measured by CPI to 
measure price (in)stability in the economy.  
II.2.2.Model and Econometric Techniques 
To investigate long-run relationship between the economic growth and financial 
development, the following model is used:  
Yit = a0 + α1tFit + β1tXit + Uit ,       (32) 
where Yit is a measure of economic growth, Fit is a measure of financial development, 
Xitis a set of control variables that includes commonly used variables in the literature 
such as trade volume, government expenditure, gross saving, and the inflation rate, and 
Uit is the error term. 
In this study we examine four different models, which include only one financial 
variable in each equation, because DCBY and M2 are highly correlated amongst 
themselves. Also for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, three control variables are used 
in one equation. Based on the set of control variables and previously mentioned reason, 
we can rewrite the equation (32) as followings: 
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LYit = a0 +a1DCBYit + b1TYit + b2GOVYit + b4CPIit + eit,         (33) 
LYit = a0 +a1DCBYit + b2GOVYit +b3GSYit + b4CPIit + eit,         (34) 
LYit = a0 +a1BMit + b1TYit + b2GOVYit + b4CPIit + eit,         (35) 
LYit = a0 +a1BMit + b2GOVYit +b3GSYit + b4CPIit + eit.         (36) 
where LYit is natural logarithm of real GDP in country i and year t, DCBYit is the ratio of 
domestic credit issued by banks to GDP, BMit is the ratio of broad money to GDP, TYit is 
the ratio of total trade to GDP, GOVYit is the ratio of government spending to GDP, 
GSYit is the ratio of gross savings to GDP, CPIit is the inflation measured by consumer 
price index, and eit is an error term. To investigate long-term relationship between 
economic growth and financial development as well as the direction of causality, 
Johansen-Juselius cointegration test, Park’s (1992) Canonical Cointegrating Regression 
(CCR), Vector of Error Correction, and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Error 
Correction Model (SURECM) and Granger (1969) causality test in a system method are 
employed.  
Unit root and stationarity tests 
Our next test to run is to test the data for presence of stationarity. It’s essential to 
test if variables have the tendency to return to the long term trend following a shock 
(stationary) or the variables follow a random walk (containing unit root). It’s well known 
that if the variables follow a random walk after any shock, the regression result between 
variables is spurious and series don’t have a finite variance, and as a result OLS will not 
produce consistent estimates. In this study, in order to test for stationarity, two tests are 
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performed, such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which tests if series exhibit 
unit root process and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test, which tests if 
series are stationary. 
ADF test tests whether a unit root is present in autoregressive model. Choosing 
the lag length for the ADF test is an important step for the implementation of the ADF 
test. If number of lags is too small then the remaining serial correlation in the errors will 
bias the test. If number of lags is too large then the power of the test will suffer. One 
possible approach is to examine the t-values on coefficients using General-to-specific 
approach. An alternative approach is to examine information criteria such as the Akaike 
information criterion, or Bayesian information criterion. Time series data Yt is non-
stationary if its autocorrelation coefficient ρ is one, then series explodes as time 
progresses and has no finite variance. If this is the case, we call that the series have a 
unit-root (ρ=1), or in a more technically Yt ~ I(1), meaning that Yt series has to be 
differenced once to be stationary. 
On the contrary, KPSS test differs from ADF unit root tests in that the series are 
assumed to be (trend-) stationary under the null hypothesis. KPSS test based on residuals 
from the OLS regression of Yt on the exogenous Xt. Series under KPSS test expressed as 
the sum of deterministic trend, random walk, and stationary error term and the test is LM 
test of the hypothesis that random walk has zero variance.  As with the ADF test, there 
are two cases to distinguish between, whether to estimate with or without a linear time 
trend. The ADF unit root test is for the null hypothesis that a time series Yt  is I(1). 
Stationarity tests, on the other hand, are for the null that Yt  is I(0). The KPSS test is the 
most commonly used stationarity test. 
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Cointegration Tests  
When time series variables are non-stationary, it is important to see if there is a 
certain common trend between those non-stationary series. If two non-stationary series 
Xt~ I(1) and Yt~ (1) have a linear relationship such that Zt = Yt –γXt and Zt ~ I(0), (Zt is 
stationary), then we call these two series are cointegrated. Broadly speaking, 
cointegration test is equivalent to examine if the residuals of regression between two non-
stationary series are stationary. If residuals are stationary, two series Xt and Yt are 
cointegrated. Next step is to test if series are cointegrated. There are different tests have 
been employed to test for the presence of cointegration. First method used in this study to 
test for presence of cointegration is Johansen-Juselius cointegration test. This method 
estimates one or more error correction equations together, obtaining estimates of the 
long-run and short-run coefficients in one pass. Johansen’s approach is to estimate the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) by maximum likelihood, under various 
assumptions about the trend or intercept parameters and the number of cointegrating 
vectors, and then conduct the likelihood ratio tests. There are two test statistics: the trace 
statistic and the maximum eigenvalue statistic. The trace statistics test is based on the 
log-likelihood ratio ln[L
max
(r)/L
max
(k)],
 
tests the null hypothesis that the number of 
distinct cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against an alternative that the 
cointegrating rank is k. The maximum eigenvalue statistics test based on log-likelihood 
ratio ln[L
max
(r)/L
max
(r+1)], tests the null that the number of cointegrating vectors is r 
against the alternative r+1 cointegrating vectors. 
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Another alternative way to test for cointegration is to use Park’s Canonical 
Cointegrating Regression (CCR). By employing Park’s CCR, we test for long-run 
relationship by computing cointegrating vectors. The main advantage of using Park’s 
CCR test is this test not only shows the number of cointegrating vectors as well as the 
presence of deterministic and stochastic cointegrating terms. 
Error Correction Model and Seemingly Unrelated Regression ECM 
In order to investigate the short run and long-run dynamics between the financial 
development and economic growth, an Error Correction Model was employed under the 
assumption of Zt = Yt –γX`t is stationary.  Based on results of Johansen-Juselius and 
Park’s CCR tests for cointegration, ECM can be performed knowing that variables are 
cointegrated. ECM specification restricts the long run behavior of the endogenous 
variables to converge to their cointegrating relationships still allowing for short run 
adjustment dynamics. Through error correction term, ECM allows the discovery of 
Granger Causality relation. 
Consider the cointegrating relation         , which represents a lont-term 
equilibrium relation between yt and xt and cointegrating factor Zt, which will be used to 
measure the deviation from this long-term relationship. Engle and Granger suggested the 
following regression to estimate the value of α: 
             .         (37) 
The cointegrating factor Zt, can be estimated if the value of    is known by 
estimating        ̂  . This model will allow testing for both short-term and long-
term relations between two time-series and is known as ECM. Then the following ECM 
87 
estimates the potential short-run and long-run effects of these two variables on each 
other: 
              ̂    ∑    (           )  ∑    (           )    
 
   
 
   ,  
(38) 
              ̂    ∑    (           )  ∑    (           )    
 
   
 
   . 
           (39)
 The ECM equations given by 38 and 39 decompose the dynamic adjustments of 
the dependent variables X into two components: 1) a long-term components given by 
cointegrating terms    ̂    and    ̂   , or error correction term, and 2) a short-term 
components given by the summation terms on the right hand side of the equations. Based 
on the equations 38 and 39, variables yt and xt are cointegrated and exhibits the long-term 
co-movements when at least one of the coefficients α1 and a1 is different from zero. If a1 
is different from zero and α1 is zero, then it said that yt follows and adjusts to xt in the 
long run. If both α1 and a1 are different from zero, x and y adjust to one another over the 
long run. The short run relation between yt and xt are given by coefficients bi and φi. It’s 
said if bi’s are not all zero and φi all zero, then x is causing y in the short run. However, if 
both coefficients are different from zero, then feedback exists and the two variables affect 
each other in the short run.  
In this study, four different models based on number of financial proxies and 
control variables have been studied (equations 33-36). In each model specification, the 
error correction term  ̂  has been estimated using the cointegrating vector obtained from 
Park’s CCR for each 16 countries in the sample.  
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Next step in this study is to run Seemingly Unrelated Regression Error Correction 
Model (SURECM) using the error correction term  ̂ , which can be estimated using the 
cointegration vector from Park’s CCR. Seemingly unrelated models are called so due to 
contemporaneous errors, which may be correlated across the system of equation.  A 
single model may contain a number of linear equations. In such a model it is often 
unrealistic to expect that the equation errors would be uncorrelated. A set of equations 
that has contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation (i.e. the error terms in the 
regression equations are correlated) is called a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
system. At first look, the equations seem unrelated, but the equations are related through 
the correlation in the errors. Zellner (1962) suggested the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model as p correlated regression equations and the p regression 
equations are “seemingly unrelated” because taken separately the error terms would 
follow standard linear OLS linear model form. However, the standard OLS model 
normally ignores any correlation among the residuals across equations. In SUR models 
the dependent variables are correlated and the design matrices may contain some of the 
same variables there may be contemporaneous” correlation among the errors across the p 
equations. Therefore, SUR models are often employed when there may be several 
equations, which appear to be unrelated; however, they may be related by the fact that: 
(1) some coefficients are the same or assumed to be zero; (2) the disturbances are 
correlated across equations; and/or (3) a subset of right hand side variables are the same. 
If the equations in the system have exactly same number of explanatory variables and 
exactly same lag-length, then there is no efficiency gain for running SUR. The efficiency 
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gain can be obtained only if cross-sectional terms           and       (in our example 
DCBY, TY, GOVY, GSY and CPI) are highly correlated with each other. So ECM for all 
countries in the sample will be investigated as a system of seemingly unrelated equations, 
which will account for cross-equation correlation of residuals among countries. 
Granger Causality test 
 Correlation and cointegration do not necessarily imply the causality in any 
meaningful sense of this word. Many previous literatures employed one of the two 
asymptotically equivalent test procedures for testing the null hypothesis of unidirectional 
causality against the alternative of feedback such as Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) 
causality tests. In this study, in order to study for causal relationships between the 
financial development and economic growth and find the direction of causality, the 
Granger causality test has been adopted. The Granger (1969) method is to question 
whether xt causes yt  and see how much of the current value of yt can be explained by past 
values of yt and then to see whether adding lagged values of xt can improve the 
explanation of yt.  In order words, Granger causality test can be interpreted as following: 
yt said to be Granger-caused by xt if xt helps in prediction of yt and the coefficients of 
lagged values of xt are statistically significant. By running Granger causality test we 
investigate the following hypothesis: 
H0: X does not cause Y (or H0: β1 = β2 = … = βm = 0; from the VAR model Yt = ∑ αi Yt-i 
+ ∑βiXt-i + εt), against alternative hypothesis of 
Ha: X Granger cause Y. 
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Rejection of null hypothesis implies that current and past lagged values of xt help predict 
the current values of yt.   Analogically, this technique can be used in investigating 
whether or not yt causes xt. In this study regular VAR based Granger causality test and 
Granger causality test based on SURECM in system method were employed to compare 
the results of regular Granger test versus system method.  
II.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section provides the description of data analysis and discusses the results of 
various tests to investigate the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth and find the direction of causality. The results of all tests are discussed in the 
separate subsections.  
Unit root tests 
Before proceeding to the identification of a possible relationship, it’s important to 
verify that all variables are integrated of order one in levels or they are I(1) process. In 
this study, two tests are performed to test for unit root or stationarity, such as the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which tests if series exhibit unit root and 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test, which tests if series are stationary.  
 ADF test regresses the first difference of variable against a set of lagged variables 
of itself. The null hypothesis is that the series contain a unit root against the alternative no 
unit root. Selection of lag length is an important step in the ADF test. If number of lags is 
too small then the remaining serial correlation in the errors will bias the test. If number of 
lags is too large then the power of the test will suffer. One possible way is to examine the 
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t-values on coefficients using General-to-specific method also known as Hall’s method. 
An alternative approach is to examine the Akaike or Bayesian information criterion. 
Table 2.1 describes ADF test results with three different results for lag-length selection 
for 16 Asian economies during the period 1980-2010 for seven variables such as LY (log 
of real GDP), DCBY (the ratio of domestic credit issued by banks to GDP), BM the ratio 
of broad money to GDP), TY (the ratio of total trade to GDP), GSY (the ratio of gross 
domestic savings to GDP), GOVY ( the ratio of government expenditures to GDP), and 
CPI (the inflation rate measured by CPI). In most of the cases, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that they contain unit root. ADF test results confirm that almost all variables 
are non-stationary at 5 % significance level with the exception of BM for Pakistan, 
GOVY for Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, TY for New Zealand, and GSY 
for Nepal, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka (which are already stationary in levels) and they 
are stationary after first differencing.  
On the contrary the null hypothesis of KPSS test is that the series are stationary 
versus an alternative of non-stationary.  The results of KPSS test clearly indicate that 
variables are not stationary or trend-stationary in levels, since in almost every case the 
null hypothesis at a significance level of 5% was rejected. Since the data selected in this 
study are non-stationary in levels and stationary in first differencing, we can now test for 
presence of cointegration among series.  
Cointegration Test 
Once we determine that the data series are integrated by means of unit root tests, 
it is now essential to verify whether they do form a cointegrated system of variables. If 
time-series variables are non-stationary, the next step is to see if there is a certain 
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common trend between those non-stationary series. When two non-stationary series Xt~ 
I(1) and Yt~ (1) have a linear relationship, which is expressed as  Zt = Yt –γXt and Zt ~ 
I(0), (Zt is stationary), then we say that these two series are cointegrated. Cointegration 
test is equivalent to examine if the residuals of regression between two non-stationary 
series, Zt, are stationary. If residuals are stationary, two series Xt and Yt are cointegrated. 
In this study, there are two different methods were used to test for presence of 
cointegration or test if series are cointegrated.  
First, we employed Johansen-Juselius test for multivariate cointegration. The 
Johansen-Juselius cointegration approach produces two test statistics such as the trace, λ 
trace, and maximum eigenvalue statistics, λ max. We proceed sequentially from r = 0 to r = k 
– 1, where k is the number of endogenous variables, until fail to reject to determine the 
number of cointegrating relations, r. The two tests of the null hypothesis of r 
cointegrating relations against the alternative of k cointegrating relations, for r = 0, 1,…, 
k-1 are reported in tables 2.3, 24, 2.5 and 2.6 for all four models. Based on the results of 
trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics, we can conclude that all models exhibit at least 
one cointegrating relations. However, Johansen-Juselius test for cointegration does not 
provide information whether the series present stochastic or deterministic cointegrating 
terms. In this regard, we run Park’s CCR to test for long-run dynamics,  for presence of 
deterministic or stochastic cointegrating terms and estimate the cointegrating vector for 
every single variable for each country and each thirteen models. In order to run Park’s 
CCR, we adopted Masao Ogaki’s Gauss code for Park’s CCR and modified it for the 
given data set and model specifications. The results of CCR test are shown in tables 2.7, 
2.8, 2.9 and 2.10, which display the cointegrating vectors for every single country and 
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variables in each model.  CCR results for Model 1, which includes DCBY as financial 
proxy and TY, GOVY, and CPI as control variables, the stochastic cointegrating 
restrictions are rejected at 5 % significant level for countries like Australia, India, New 
Zealand, and Singapore, however, the deterministic cointegrating restrictions are failed to 
reject at 5% significant level. In model 2, almost all countries have presence of stochastic 
cointegrating term except India, Indonesia, and New Zealand, where the deterministic 
cointegrating term are failed to reject at 5 % significant level. CCR results for model 3 
shows that all countries exhibit the presence of stochastic cointegrating term except 
Australia and Singapore, which are showing the deterministic cointegrating term. In 
model 4, almost in all countries the stochastic cointegrating restriction are failed to reject 
at 5% significance level, excluding Nepal, New Zealand and Singapore. However, the 
deterministic cointegrating term are failed to reject at 5 % significant level for these three 
countries. So based on Park’s CCR result, we can conclude that all countries in all four 
model exhibit the presence of cointegration, either its deterministic or stochastic 
cointegrating term. In addition to presence of cointegrating term, the magnitude and the 
signs of cointegrating vectors in all models are consistent with the economic theories and 
our expectations.  
ECM and SURECM 
Based on CCR results we were able to estimate the cointegrating vectors for our 
models under the investigation. Now, next step in this study is to investigate the short-run 
and long-run dynamics between financial development and economic growth by running 
Error Correction Model (ECM) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression Error Correction 
Model (SURECM) in the system method. Through error correction term, ECM and 
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SURECM allow the discovery of Granger Causality relation between the financial 
development and economic growth for Asian countries. The results of ordinary ECM and 
SURECM for models 1 and 2 are reported in Tables 2.11 and 2.12.  
We do not have statistically significant  ̂  for all countries based on regular ECM 
results for model 1.  However, the results of non-restrictive SURECM indicate that 8 
countries out of 16 have statistically significant  ̂ . This significant improvement has 
been obtained due to system method, which is more efficient than ordinary methods. 
More specifically, when markets have a close relationship with one another, SURECM 
approach accounts for cross equation correlations among the countries in the system. 
SURECM method utilizes the information in the variance-covariance matrix of residuals 
in the system to improve the efficiency. In addition to running non-restrictive SURECM, 
we have also run the restricted SURECM by applying the restrictions that all countries 
have same coefficient for speed of adjustment. The results of restrictive model show that 
we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that   ̂  are not equal for all countries in the 
system. This result is fairly same as we run panel error correction model assuming that 
countries in this sample are homogeneous. However the results of restrictive SURECM 
revealed the heterogeneity of countries in this study. Since the countries in this study are 
Asian economies which share same geographical location, trading partners and historical-
cultural background, however, they are heterogeneous in terms of their income, economic 
growth and level of financial liberalization. In order to eliminate the heterogeneity issue, 
we have run SURECM for high-income, middle-income and low-income countries 
separately. The results of non-restrictive SURECM for different income groups show that 
none of countries exhibit statistically significant speed of adjustment coefficient for high-
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income countries group, statistically significant coefficient at 1% and 10% level for 
middle-income and low-income countries respectively. In addition to this, it was 
interesting to see the effect of Chinese economy among the countries in the region. So we 
have run SURECM without China. Based on this result we can see that the results have 
been worsened significantly and there are only 5 countries with statistically significant 
speed of adjustment coefficient instead of seven as before. Also number of countries with 
statistically significant coefficients has been reduced for group of middle-income 
countries as well. Based on these two different results of SURECM, we can conclude that 
we cannot imagine world economy, especially, Asian economies without China.  
 Furthermore, the regular ECM and non-restrictive SURECM results for model 2 
is reported in Table 2.12. Here, only Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Bangladesh and India 
exhibit statistically significant estimates for speed of adjustment, saying that there are 
only 5 countries out of 16 display long run relations between economic growth and the 
financial development, which has been improved significantly after running the same 
model in the system method. The results of non-restrictive SURECM show that 13 
countries out of 16 have a long run relationship between finance (expressed as the ratio of 
domestic credit issued by banks to GDP) and growth.  Model 2 differs from model 1 in 
that it has a different set of control variables, which accounts for the role of gross 
domestic savings instead of role of international trade as one of the growth factors. The 
inclusion of GSY instead of TY as one of the control variables significantly improved the 
results of estimation. Economic theory recognizes the role of savings for economic 
development, which is shown in the results of SURECM of Model 2. The restrictive 
SURECM for model 2 shows that we reject the null hypothesis that speed of adjustment 
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coefficinet  ̂  are same for all 16 countries. The results of non-restrictive SURECM for 
different income groups show that only 2 countries exhibit statistically significant speed 
of adjustment coefficient for high-income and middle-income countries and 3 counties in 
low-income group. However, the results of restrictive SURECM also present the fact of 
heterogeneity of the markets. Similar results can be said about the role of China in Asian 
economy. Table 2.12 also shows that there is a reduction in number of countries with 
statistically significant speed of adjustment coefficient. In this case, we have only 8 
countries out of 16 with long run relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. However, there are not many changes in SURECM results in three 
income groups. Models 1 and 2 employ DCBY (the ratio of domestic credit issued by 
banks to GDP) or the degree of dependence upon banking sector (or role of bank loan) as 
financial proxy.  
Similarly, the results of ordinary ECM and SURECM for models 3 and 4 are 
reported in Tables 2.13 and 2.14, however in these models BM (the ratio of broad money 
to GDP) has been used as financial proxy with the same sets of control variables as model 
1 and 2 such that model 3 includes TY, GOVY, CPI and model 4 includes GOVY, GSY, 
CPI as control variables. The results of ordinary ECM for model 3 indicate that only 
India has cointegrating relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. However, the results of non-restrictive SURECM show that there are 9 countries 
out of 16 have statistically significant point estimates of speed of adjustment 
coefficient  ̂ , and we reject the null hypothesis in restrictive SURECM model as before. 
We run sensitivity analysis by running SURECM without China, which shows a slight 
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reduction in number of countries with statistically significant coefficients and fairly 
similar results for restrictive model.  
Finally, ECM and SURECM results for model 4 are reported in Tables 2.14. The 
result of regular ECM shows only four countries have statistically significant speed of 
adjustment coefficient, while non-restrictive SURECM shows 9 countries in the sample 
have statistically significant  ̂ , which demonstrates the presence of long-run relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. The restrictive SURECM displays 
that speed of adjustment coefficients are not same for all countries, which points out to 
the fact that countries are not homogenous. We have also run sensitivity analysis for 
entire system and middle income sub-group without China and as before the number of 
countries with statistically significant speed of adjustment has been decreased compare to 
initial SURECM results.   
Granger Causality test 
Final test in this study is to test for contemporaneous causality relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. Granger causality test based on ordinary 
VAR and Granger causality test based on SURECM methods are employed to test for 
contemporaneous causality and find the direction of causality. The results of VAR based 
Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, and 2.18.  According to 
Granger causality tests presented in Table 2.15, we found no evidence of causality in 
either direction between total bank credit and economic growth for 12 countries, evidence 
of two-way causality in only one country, evidence of positive causality running from 
finance to growth in two countries and negative causality running from growth to finance 
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in one country. The results of VAR based Granger causality test of model 1 provide a 
weak support for the hypothesis that Levine and King discussed that financial 
development ‘leads’ economic growth.  
 The results of VAR based Granger causality test for model 2 provide similar 
evidence as in model 2: we found the evidence of no causality in 8 countries; the 
evidence of positive causality in four countries; the evidence of reverse causality running 
from economic growth to finance in two countries; and bidirectional causality for two 
countries. Again these results do not provide sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis 
that financial development ‘leads’ productivity growth and, consequently, the economic 
growth. The results of models 1 and 2 are consistent with the earlier empirical literature 
such as Shan and Morris (2002) and Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011), who also examined 
the causality pattern by employing ordinary Granger causality test or panel Granger 
causality test.    
VAR based Granger causality test results for model 3 indicate the evidence of no 
causality in 6 countries, positive causality running from finance to growth in 5 countries, 
reverse causality running from growth to finance in one country, and bidirectional 
causality in four countries. VAR based granger causality results for model 4 show the 
evidence of no causality for 8 countries, the evidence of positive causality for three 
countries, the evidence of reverse causality for three countries, and bidirectional causality 
case for Sri Lanka and Thailand only. The results of models 3 and 4 are consistent with 
previous studies where VAR based Granger causality method was employed. These 
results however are in sharp contrast to those of King and Levine (1993a) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) who applied cross sectional approach and concluded that financial 
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development is a necessary precursor of economic growth. Based on the VAR based 
Granger causality test results of these four models we can conclude that: 1) the pattern of 
causality between the financial development and economic growth may be country 
specific; 2) Granger causality test results greatly affected by selection of variables, 
specifically financial proxy and control variables; 3) the direction of causality might be 
different due to selection of econometric methods used to examine the causality itself. 
Our empirical evidence of VAR based Granger causality test is consistent with previous 
literature, where VAR method was employed and contradicts the findings of studies 
where cross sectional or panel data approach were used.  
Next we run Granger causality test based on SURECM method to see if there are 
any improvements in our results if system method is applied and is there any stylized 
evidence on causality relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
The results of SURECM based Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 2.15, 2.16, 
2.17, and 2.18, which also contain Granger causality test results for different income 
groups and with/without China case. SURECM based Granger causality test results 
brought many interesting empirical evidences and the results vary depending on selection 
of financial proxy, selection of control variables, including/excluding China, and levels of 
income group. Due to these facts, the Granger causality test results are summarized in the 
following subsections. 
 Granger causality test: evidence on DCBY versus BM case 
As mentioned before, in models 1 and 2 DCBY is used as financial proxy and in 
models 3 and 4 BM is used as financial proxy. Based on Granger causality test results, we 
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found a considerable evidence of bidirectional causality in most of the countries in the 
sample, which are summarized in tables 2.19 and 2.20. In model 1 we found 11 countries 
out of 16 with bidirectional causality, 1 country with positive causality running from 
finance to growth, and 4 countries with reverse causality. First of all, there is a significant 
improvement from regular VAR based Granger causality test results. For high-income 
group we have 3 out of 5 countries with bidirectional causality, 1 country with positive 
causality and 1 country with reverse causality. For middle income countries, 5 countries 
out of 6 have bidirectional causality and one country with positive causality. For low 
income countries sub-group, there are 2 countries with bidirectional causality, 2 countries 
have positive causality, and 1 country with reverse causality. However, the results of 
model 3, which uses BM as financial variable and exactly same set of control variables as 
in model 1, are showing different results. As with model 1, Granger causality test for 
model 3 shows that 10 countries out of 16 have bidirectional causality and 6 countries 
with reverse causality. Test result for high income group demonstrates 4 countries with 
bidirectional causality and one country with reverse causality. For middle income country 
group half of the countries exhibit bidirectional causality and another half have reverse 
causalities. Low income sub-group also contains the similar results as in middle income 
group: 3 countries have bidirectional causality and remaining 2 countries have reverse 
causality. The results of sensitivity analysis for all countries and middle-income group 
without China for models 1 and 3 have been worsened significantly. In Model 1 for all 
countries excluding China, Pakistan does not have any causality evidence and 3 countries 
out of 5 do not exhibit any causality for middle-income sub-group. In model 3 Singapore 
and Thailand do not have any causal relationship between finance and economic growth. 
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This evidence clearly demonstrates the importance of Chinese economy in the region, 
more precisely China is important integral part in the Asian economy, major trade partner 
and largest producer. 
Granger causality test results of model 2 demonstrate that half of the countries 
have bidirectional causality, 5 countries out of 16 have positive causality, and 3 countries 
have reverse causality.  For high income group there are 2 countries out of 5 have 
bidirectional causality, one country with positive causality, and 2 countries with reverse 
causality. Granger causality test for middle income group shows that there are 2 countries 
with bidirectional causality, 3 countries out of 5 have positive causality, and one country 
with reverse causality. For low income group there is evidence of bidirectional causality 
in two countries, positive causality in one country, reverse causality in one country and 
no causality in one country. The results of model 4 show that 13 countries out of 16 have 
two-way causal relationship, reverse causality in 2 countries, and no causality in one 
country (Indonesia). For high income country group, we found the evidence of 
bidirectional causality in 3 countries out of 5 and positive causality in 2 countries. 
Granger causality test results for middle income sub-group report that there are 2 
countries out of 6 with bidirectional causality, 3 countries with reverse causality, and one 
country with positive causality. However, the test results for low income countries 
demonstrate that there are 3 countries out of 5 with bidirectional causality and remaining 
two countries with reverse causality. As before, the sensitivity analysis for models 2 and 
4 without China shows a substantial reduction in number of countries with no causality 
whatsoever for middle-income group and a small reduction for entire set. According to 
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these results we can conclude that China plays a significant role in the Asian economy 
and it’s not accurate to study the Asian region without China’s economy. 
Based on these results of model 1 and 3, and model 2 and 4, we can conclude: 1) 
there is strong evidence that causality exists between the financial development and 
economic growth, more specifically, direction of causality is bidirectional in most of the 
cases; 2) there is an evidence of positive causality running from finance to growth when 
we use DCBY as financial proxy, which highlights the importance of bank loan to 
promote investment and economic growth; and 3) there is a tendency of reverse causality 
running from growth to finance when BM is used as financial proxy, pointing out to the 
important role of formal bank intermediation for economic growth; and 4) cases of 
positive and reverse causality are more prominent for middle to low income countries. 
Moreover, these findings are consistent with empirical evidence of 1
st
 essay, 
which studies the long-run relationship between financial development and economic 
growth for high-income OECD countries.  
 Granger causality test: evidence on TY versus GSY case 
In models 1 and 2, DCBY is used as financial proxy, however, in model 1 TY, 
GOVY, CPI and in model 2 GSY, GOVY, CPI are used as control variables respectively. 
Comparative summaries of these models are reported in Tables 2.19 and 2.20. The main 
purpose of running these two sets of different models is to conduct the sensitivity analysis 
on control variables. When we compare model 1 and 2, there are 11 countries out of 16 in 
model 1 and 8 countries out of 16 with bidirectional causality, 1 country in model 1 and 5 
countries in model 2 with positive causality, and 4 countries in model 1 and 3 countries in 
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model 2 with reverse causality. When we use different set of control variables, the 
Granger causality test results are about the same with main outcome of bidirectional 
causality in most cases and positive causality as next evidence when DCBY is used as 
financial proxy. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that direction of causality is not 
sensitive to selection of variables in models 1 and 2. The similar results are obtained in 
sub-groups of high, middle and low income sub-groups. In high income sub-group, there 
are 3 countries in model 1 and 2 countries in model 2 with bidirectional causality, 1 
country in model 1 and 1 country in model 2 with positive causality, and 1 country in 
model 1 and 2 country in model 2 with reverse causality. For middle income countries, 
there is an evidence of bidirectional causality in majority of countries in both models and 
half of the countries with positive causality in model 2. Finally, for low income sub-
group we found bidirectional causality cases in two countries in both models, and strong 
evidence of positive causality running from finance to growth in model 1. Based on these 
results we can conclude that the model specification is not sensitive to selection of 
control variables. In both models 1 and 2, we have a consistency with our previous 
conclusion that when DCBY is used as financial proxy, the direction of causality is two 
way and there is a presence of positive causality as a second evidence. Same sensitivity 
analysis has been conducted for models 3 and 4, where BM is used as financial proxy and 
TY, GOVY, CPI in model 3 and GSY, GOVY, CPI in model 4 are used as control 
variables. The results are similar to that of model 1 and 2. We found the evidence of 
bidirectional causality in majority of countries: 10 countries out of 16 in model 3 and 13 
countries out of 16 in model 4. Also the cases of reverse causality as secondary evidence 
found in all sub-groups in model 3 and 4 with the exception of low income sub-group in 
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model 4,which shows the presence of positive causality. We can summarize that 
whenever BM is used as financial proxy there is a strong tendency of reverse causality 
running from growth to finance as secondary evidence after bidirectional causality cases. 
Sensitivity analysis demonstrates that using TY (the share of total trade to GDP) or GSY 
(the share of gross savings to GDP) does not affect the model specification and direction 
of causality.  
 Granger causality test: evidence on with China versus without China case 
Another important part of SURECM based Granger causality test is to conduct the 
sensitivity test of Chinese economy on Asian economy, trade, investment and financial 
system. Over the last decade three words seen very often were “made in China”. 
Important evidence found about the role of China or impact of Chinese economy on 
regional economy. Sensitivity test were conducted for all four models. In model 1, after 
running SURECM-based Granger causality test, without China, the number of countries 
with no causality between financial development and economic growth increased from 
zero to one. Even though this is considered a very small change, but this result still shows 
the importance of China in the region. In addition to this, Granger causality test without 
China has been done for group of middle income countries. Granger causality test for this 
sub-group demonstrates a significant change in causality: now we have three countries 
with causality, which does not make any economic sense. In today’s world economy, we 
cannot imagine any economy without China effect. So the results of model 1 with and 
without China highlight the important role and impact of China in the region and this 
effect is more significant among developing countries, especially for middle income 
countries. 
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We found similar results in Model 2, 3 and 4 as well. In model 2 for Granger 
causality test for all countries without China, this time Australia shows no causality 
between finance and growth at all versus positive causality in initial test.  More dramatic 
results are obtained in middle income sub-group, when China was excluded from 
Granger causality test it shows three countries out of five exhibit no causality versus none 
in initial test. In model 3 Indonesia and Korea have no causality after excluding China 
from the test and for middle income sub-group 4 countries out of 5 do not have any 
causality relationship between financial development and economic growth. We can say 
same conclusion about model 4 as well. For model 4, there are 3 countries now have no 
causality in middle income sub-group. In summary, China has a huge impact on Asian 
economy and more precisely it has a significant impact on middle income countries’ 
economy as trade partner, producer and investor.  
II.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the long-run dynamics and the 
direction of causality between financial development and economic growth for 16 Asian 
economies with different levels of income and in most efficient manner via system 
method. In this study ADF and KPSS unit root tests, Johansen-Juselius and Parks CCR 
test for cointegration, ECM, SURECM and Granger causality test in system method were 
employed as empirical evidence. Based on the results of Granger causality test in system 
method, I found: 1) strong evidence that causality exists between the financial 
development and economic growth, more specifically, direction of causality is 
bidirectional in most of the cases; 2) an evidence of positive causality running from 
finance to growth when we use DCBY as financial proxy, which highlights the 
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importance of bank loan to promote investment and economic growth; and 3) a tendency 
of reverse causality running from growth to finance when BM is used as financial proxy, 
pointing out to the important role of formal bank intermediation for economic growth; 4) 
cases of one-way causality such as positive and reverse causality are more prominent for 
middle to low income countries.; 5) an evidence that China has a huge impact on Asian 
economy and more precisely it has a significant impact on developing economies such as 
middle and low income countries; and 6) selection of control variables does not affect the 
model specification and the direction of causality. These results are consistent with 
earlier literature in that the direction of causality may be country specific. However, it 
does not support King and Levine’s (1993a) conclusion that finance is a leading sector to 
economic growth. The findings clearly demonstrate that the directions of causality vary 
across countries and emphasis that the system method is superior to single equation 
approach. In addition to this, it’s worthwhile to mention that the findings in this essay are 
consistent with empirical evidence of 1
st
 essay, which studies the long run relationship 
between financial development and economic growth for high-income OECD countries. 
The question might give some further guidance as to whether a well-developed financial 
sector is a necessary condition for a higher growth rates for developing countries and 
provide an important policy implication both for OECD countries as well as for countries 
that have financial sectors that are comparatively underdeveloped.  
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Table 2.3 Johansen-Juselius test for cointegration
Model 1 LY =f(DCBY, TY, GOVY, CPI)
countries None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4 None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4
1 Australia 79.992 * 46.567 21.314 8.244 1.780 33.425 * 25.253 13.070 6.464 1.780
2 Bangladesh 90.117 ** 57.809 ** 33.481 * 16.054 * 3.059 32.308 24.328 17.426 12.995 3.059
3 China 122.112 ** 63.208 ** 31.966 * 9.005 1.460 58.904 ** 31.242 * 22.961 * 7.545 1.460
4 India 92.981 ** 58.961 ** 28.917 8.346 3.863 * 34.021 * 30.044 * 20.570 4.483 3.863 *
5 Indonesia 71.427 * 36.574 13.885 4.713 0.105 34.854 * 22.688 9.172 4.608 0.105
6 Japan 89.347 ** 44.810 22.096 6.309 0.398 44.537 ** 22.714 15.787 5.911 0.398
7 Korea 69.273 * 27.623 15.418 6.509 1.647 41.651 ** 12.204 8.909 4.862 1.647
8 Malaysia 74.157 * 40.731 21.560 9.288 2.937 33.426 19.171 12.272 6.350 2.937
9 Nepal 112.542 ** 38.730 17.048 5.439 0.908 73.812 ** 21.683 11.609 4.530 0.908
10 New Zealand 107.583 ** 50.069 * 21.565 6.802 1.803 57.514 ** 28.504 * 14.763 4.999 1.803
11 Pakistan 71.649 * 41.953 18.964 5.860 2.862 29.696 22.989 13.103 2.998 2.862
12 Papua N. G. 115.544 ** 52.590 * 22.354 9.174 0.070 62.954 ** 30.236 * 13.181 9.103 0.070
13 Philippines 70.499 * 37.332 18.711 4.967 0.463 33.167 18.621 13.744 4.504 0.463
14 Singapore 90.988 ** 58.741 ** 27.606 ** 13.187 5.044 * 32.247 31.135 * 14.419 8.143 5.044 *
15 Sri Lanka 94.387 ** 55.818 ** 27.141 10.155 0.090 38.569 28.677 16.986 10.065 0.090
16 Thailand 90.026 ** 55.302 ** 31.650 * 10.590 3.720 34.724 * 23.652 21.061 * 3.720
5% CV 1% CV 5% CV 1% CV
68.520 76.070 33.460 38.770
47.210 54.460 27.070 32.240
29.680 35.650 20.970 25.520
15.410 20.040 14.070 18.630
3.760 6.650 3.760 6.650
 * (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level
Trace statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s) Max-Eigen statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s)
Table 2.4 Johansen-Juselius test for cointegration
Model 2 LY =f(DCBY, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
countries None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4 None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4
1 Australia 80.254 ** 45.177 22.263 5.260 0.007 35.077 * 22.914 17.002 5.253 0.007
2 Bangladesh 179.741 ** 89.827 ** 40.851 ** 11.810 0.209 89.914 ** 48.976 ** 29.041 ** 11.601 0.209
3 China 304.856 ** 163.624 ** 70.189 ** 17.002 * 1.413 141.232 ** 93.434 ** 53.187 ** 15.589 * 1.413
4 India 78.557 * 46.819 23.214 11.269 2.755 31.738 23.605 11.945 8.515 2.755
5 Indonesia 103.079 ** 56.579 ** 23.398 6.325 1.064 46.500 ** 33.181 ** 17.073 5.261 1.064
6 Japan 128.889 ** 48.743 * 20.819 5.321 0.079 80.146 ** 27.924 * 15.498 5.242 0.079
7 Korea 91.038 ** 44.996 14.295 6.627 1.639 46.042 ** 30.701 * 7.667 4.988 1.639
8 Malaysia 69.968 * 35.385 14.763 6.813 2.656 34.583 * 20.622 7.950 4.157 2.656
9 Nepal 86.887 * 41.682 16.640 5.131 1.287 45.204 * 25.042 11.509 3.844 1.287
10 New Zealand 93.987 ** 56.163 ** 25.607 11.069 2.166 37.824 * 30.556 * 14.538 8.903 2.166
11 Pakistan 82.421 ** 48.291 * 24.211 10.242 0.105 34.130 * 24.080 13.968 10.138 0.105
12 Papua N. G. 71.710 * 43.157 22.788 9.377 0.001 28.554 20.369 13.411 9.375 0.001
13 Philippines 69.886 * 36.990 18.425 5.306 0.112 32.896 18.565 13.119 5.195 0.112
14 Singapore 83.576 ** 58.656 ** 37.308 ** 18.838 * 7.937 ** 24.921 21.348 18.470 10.901 7.937 **
15 Sri Lanka 85.620 ** 49.614 * 26.190 12.620 0.109 36.006 * 23.424 13.570 12.511 0.109
16 Thailand 88.481 ** 38.250 16.228 7.815 2.171 50.231 ** 22.022 8.413 5.644 2.171
5% CV 1% CV 5% CV 1% CV
68.520 76.070 33.460 38.770
47.210 54.460 27.070 32.240
29.680 35.650 20.970 25.520
15.410 20.040 14.070 18.630
3.760 6.650 3.760 6.650
 * (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level
Trace statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s) Max-Eigen statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s)
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Table 2.5 Johansen-Juselius test for cointegration
Model 3 LY =f(BM, TY, GOVY, CPI)
countries None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4 None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4
1 Australia 80.544 ** 51.343 * 27.286 9.758 2.743 29.201 24.057 17.528 7.016 2.743
2 Bangladesh 229.460 ** 104.050 ** 64.666 ** 29.079 * 4.524 125.410 ** 39.384 ** 35.586 ** 24.555 * 4.524
3 China 233.015 ** 120.683 ** 59.525 ** 22.733 ** 5.838 * 112.332 ** 61.158 ** 36.792 ** 16.895 ** 5.838 *
4 India 114.129 ** 73.897 ** 40.143 ** 19.282 * 3.576 40.232 ** 33.754 ** 20.861 15.707 * 3.576
5 Indonesia 111.658 ** 41.275 14.345 5.189 0.000 70.383 ** 26.930 9.157 5.188 0.000
6 Japan 109.658 ** 53.513 * 21.909 4.867 1.012 56.144 ** 31.605 * 17.042 3.855 1.012
7 Korea 89.425 ** 51.379 * 24.182 8.765 1.803 38.047 * 27.197 * 15.417 6.962 1.803
8 Malaysia 71.776 * 42.916 22.158 9.184 2.798 28.860 20.758 12.974 6.386 2.798
9 Nepal 109.735 ** 43.264 15.289 6.041 1.206 66.471 ** 27.975 * 9.248 4.835 1.206
10 New Zealand 123.681 ** 58.032 ** 21.275 9.470 1.192 65.649 ** 36.757 ** 11.805 8.278 1.192
11 Pakistan 69.232 ** 34.853 16.122 5.337 1.161 28.379 18.731 10.784 4.176 1.161
12 Papua N. G. 81.040 ** 49.144 * 27.377 9.426 0.118 31.896 21.766 17.951 9.308 0.118
13 Philippines 108.769 ** 44.658 23.452 8.007 0.474 64.111 ** 21.206 15.445 7.533 0.474
14 Singapore 80.118 ** 42.475 21.101 6.591 3.064 37.644 * 21.374 14.510 3.527 3.064
15 Sri Lanka 80.423 ** 40.133 21.653 8.670 1.010 40.289 ** 18.481 12.982 7.660 1.010
16 Thailand 106.251 ** 56.615 ** 22.958 9.237 4.007 * 49.636 ** 33.657 ** 13.721 5.230 4.007 *
5% CV 1% CV 5% CV 1% CV
68.520 76.070 33.460 38.770
47.210 54.460 27.070 32.240
29.680 35.650 20.970 25.520
15.410 20.040 14.070 18.630
3.760 6.650 3.760 6.650
 * (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level
Trace statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s) Max-Eigen statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s)
Table 2.6 Johansen-Juselius test for cointegration
Model 4 LY =f(BM, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
countries None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4 None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4
1 Australia 84.958 ** 51.151 * 27.701 5.549 0.010 33.807 * 23.450 22.152 * 5.540 0.010
2 Bangladesh 253.140 ** 123.053 ** 53.289 ** 10.474 0.530 130.087 ** 69.764 ** 42.815 ** 9.944 0.530
3 China 305.468 ** 169.120 ** 91.173 ** 30.008 ** 7.770 ** 136.348 ** 77.947 ** 61.165 ** 22.237 ** 7.770 **
4 India 87.109 ** 53.476 * 24.103 12.395 3.145 33.633 * 29.373 * 11.709 9.250 3.145
5 Indonesia 98.077 ** 39.423 19.033 7.882 1.008 58.653 ** 20.390 11.151 6.874 1.008
6 Japan 129.562 ** 45.505 18.475 5.424 0.437 84.057 ** 27.030 13.051 4.986 0.437
7 Korea 72.860 * 41.249 21.765 10.783 4.341 * 31.611 19.485 10.982 6.442 4.341 *
8 Malaysia 69.369 * 34.416 15.959 6.396 2.296 34.953 * 18.457 9.563 4.100 2.296
9 Nepal 97.475 ** 47.365 * 18.147 7.574 2.160 50.111 ** 29.217 * 10.573 5.414 2.160
10 New Zealand 92.788 ** 58.037 ** 26.065 11.711 0.062 34.751 * 31.972 * 14.354 11.649 0.062
11 Pakistan 78.334 ** 51.184 * 29.755 * 11.469 0.132 27.150 21.429 18.286 11.337 0.132
12 Papua N. G. 80.837 ** 39.128 15.987 4.168 0.009 41.708 ** 23.142 11.819 4.158 0.009
13 Philippines 74.430 * 37.966 14.420 6.486 0.140 36.464 * 23.546 7.934 6.346 0.140
14 Singapore 87.732 * 51.198 * 26.184 9.965 2.244 36.534 * 25.014 16.219 7.721 2.244
15 Sri Lanka 86.606 ** 55.363 ** 30.874 * 12.620 1.015 31.243 24.489 18.254 11.606 1.015
16 Thailand 91.715 ** 52.204 * 23.037 8.804 3.684 39.512 ** 29.166 * 14.234 5.120 3.684
5% CV 1% CV 5% CV 1% CV
68.520 76.070 33.460 38.770
47.210 54.460 27.070 32.240
29.680 35.650 20.970 25.520
15.410 20.040 14.070 18.630
3.760 6.650 3.760 6.650
 * (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level
Trace statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s) Max-Eigen statistics: Hypothesized no. of CE (s)
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Table 2.7  Park's CCR test results
Model 1 LY =f(DCBY, TY, GOVY, CPI)
DCBY TY GOVY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
AUSTRALIA -0.076 0.171 -0.119 0.053 0.049 5.885 12.408
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.826) (0.015) (0.002)
BANGLADESH -0.162 0.050 -0.039 0.026 2.513 0.100 1.256
(0.041) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.113) (0.752) (0.534)
CHINA 0.077 0.067 0.032 -0.058 1.212 0.018 2.817
(0.111) (0.048) (0.017) (0.045) (0.271) (0.893) (0.244)
INDIA 0.379 0.350 -0.104 -0.009 2.365 43.274 96.835
(0.052) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000)
INDONESIA -0.267 0.058 -0.010 0.013 1.774 4.059 4.358
(0.021) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.183) (0.044) (0.113)
JAPAN -0.026 0.004 0.007 -0.069 4.452 1.444 7.424
(0.025) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.035) (0.230) (0.024)
KOREA -0.031 0.011 0.012 0.068 2.182 2.021 2.045
(0.026) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.140) (0.155) (0.360)
MALAYSIA -0.187 0.282 -0.166 0.014 6.348 0.180 0.360
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.001) (0.012) (0.672) (0.835)
NEPAL 0.021 0.020 -0.016 0.019 0.927 2.744 43.628
(0.023) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.336) (0.100) (0.000)
NEW ZEALAND 0.026 0.014 0.002 0.007 0.037 6.632 7.637
(0.012) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.848) (0.010) (0.022)
PAKISTAN 0.122 -0.012 -0.025 0.047 13.422 1.024 2.369
(0.048) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.000) (0.312) (0.306)
PAPUA N.G. -0.013 0.026 0.013 0.018 10.420 0.150 25.282
(0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.699) (0.000)
PHILLIPPINES 0.436 -0.010 -0.095 -0.015 2.852 1.736 2.012
(0.040) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) (0.091) (0.188) (0.366)
SINGAPORE -0.346 -0.921 0.747 -0.256 0.093 14.764 19.428
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.761) (0.000) (0.000)
SRI LANKA 0.485 0.115 0.105 0.006 0.018 0.079 0.540
(0.035) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.892) (0.779) (0.763)
THAILAND 0.043 0.089 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.076 1.726
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.993) (0.783) (0.422)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; BM: broad money/GDP;
TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP; GSY: gross savings/GDP;
CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
the H(1, q) statistic tests stochastic cointegration.
* countries with no cointegration
β (a)
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Table 2.8  Park's CCR test results
Model 2 LY =f(DCBY, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
DCBY GSY GOVY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
AUSTRALIA -0.104 -0.002 0.068 0.049 4.416 0.529 2.164
(0.004 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.036) (0.467) (0.339)
BANGLADESH 0.301 -0.030 -0.107 -0.035 0.003 0.090 0.163
(0.077) (0.022) (0.028) (0.007) (0.960) (0.765) (0.922)
CHINA -0.069 -0.013 -0.002 0.023 0.926 6.042 12.162
(0.039) (0.018) (0.008) (0.019) (0.336) (0.014) (0.002)
INDIA 0.187 0.193 -0.034 -0.002 0.008 14.233 14.252
(0.051) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.930) (0.000) (0.001)
INDONESIA 0.115 -0.029 0.006 0.000 11.236 0.395 9.297
(0.018) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.529) (0.010)
JAPAN 0.013 0.003 0.003 -0.005 1.419 2.413 10.269
(0.020) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.234) (0.120) (0.006)
KOREA -0.376 0.002 0.052 0.385 53.975 1.429 15.273
(0.024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.232) (0.000)
MALAYSIA -0.851 0.348 -0.330 0.004 2.193 0.516 17.217
(0.047) (0.018) (0.025) (0.001) (0.139) (0.473) (0.000)
NEPAL -0.022 0.069 0.002 0.020 11.135 0.389 20.748
(0.026) (0.011) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.533) (0.000)
NEW ZEALAND -0.046 -0.012 0.000 0.002 0.003 119.171 226.133
(0.011) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.958) (0.000) (0.000)
PAKISTAN 0.084 0.101 -0.027 -0.023 16.226 1.450 1.455
(0.090) (0.022) (0.031) (0.018) (0.000) (0.229) (0.483)
PAPUA N.G. 0.014 0.013 0.012 -0.045 0.004 1.617 34.576
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.948) (0.203) (0.000)
PHILLIPPINES -0.219 -0.121 -0.007 0.029 0.348 0.096 3.251
(0.052) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.555) (0.756) (0.197)
SINGAPORE -0.275 0.047 0.061 0.122 0.006 2.679 18.327
(0.035) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014) (0.940) (0.102) (0.000)
SRI LANKA 0.316 -0.014 0.059 0.080 0.267 0.022 2.297
(0.027) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.605) (0.881) (0.317)
THAILAND -0.151 0.213 -0.031 0.002 6.804 1.711 3.949
(0.041) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009) (0.191) (0.139)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; BM: broad money/GDP;
TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP; GSY: gross savings/GDP;
CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
the H(1, q) statistic tests stochastic cointegration.
* countries with no cointegration
β (a)
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Table 2.9  Park's CCR test results
Model 3 LY =f(BM, TY, GOVY, CPI)
BM TY GOVY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
AUSTRALIA -0.215 0.221 -0.159 0.077 1.830 19.913 22.849
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000)
BANGLADESH -0.040 0.034 0.044 -0.045 108.457 0.041 5.058
(0.044) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.000) (0.840) (0.080)
CHINA -0.118 0.014 -0.039 0.085 9.454 0.002 1.602
(0.054) (0.009) (0.028) (0.036) (0.002) (0.964) (0.449)
INDIA 0.571 0.030 -0.045 0.087 2.804 0.283 5.310
(0.062) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.094) (0.595) (0.070)
INDONESIA 0.095 -0.044 0.045 0.000 6.605 2.263 2.441
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.010) (0.132) (0.295)
JAPAN 0.022 0.006 0.011 -0.047 0.097 0.011 10.937
(0.022) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.755) (0.915) (0.004)
KOREA 0.264 -0.006 0.089 -0.031 0.376 0.457 13.246
(0.040) (0.003) (0.014) (0.010) (0.540) (0.499) (0.001)
MALAYSIA -0.235 -0.047 0.018 0.003 0.314 1.988 26.309
(0.088) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.575) (0.159) (0.000)
NEPAL -0.062 0.017 0.035 -0.012 0.819 2.212 2.988
(0.061) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.366) (0.137) (0.224)
NEW ZEALAND -0.002 0.019 0.006 0.004 28.045 1.422 1.592
(0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.233) (0.451)
PAKISTAN 0.419 0.004 -0.059 -0.062 6.029 0.037 0.109
(0.066) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.847) (0.947)
PAPUA N.G. -0.112 0.003 0.002 -0.045 0.070 0.020 3.619
(0.028) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.791) (0.887) (0.164)
PHILLIPPINES -0.063 0.009 0.043 -0.004 0.078 0.711 34.250
(0.014) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.780) (0.399) (0.000)
SINGAPORE -0.137 0.022 0.043 -0.006 0.352 5.307 6.348
(0.011) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.553) (0.021) (0.042)
SRI LANKA 0.088 0.006 0.073 0.024 42.702 0.001 0.054
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.974) (0.974)
THAILAND -0.192 -0.015 -0.011 0.033 0.494 1.655 10.463
(0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.482) (0.198) (0.005)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; BM: broad money/GDP;
TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP; GSY: gross savings/GDP;
CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
the H(1, q) statistic tests stochastic cointegration.
* countries with no cointegration
β (a)
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Table 2.10  Park's CCR test results
Model 4 LY =f(BM, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
BM GSY GOVY CPI H(0,1)
(b)
H(1,2)
(b)
H(1,3)
(b)
AUSTRALIA -0.067 -0.037 0.124 0.034 31.110 4.005 4.053
(0.028) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.045) (0.132)
BANGLADESH 0.132 0.073 0.050 -0.157 10.809 0.181 5.168
(0.040) (0.035) (0.007) (0.024) (0.001) (0.671) (0.075)
CHINA -0.123 0.007 -0.016 0.086 1.268 2.492 2.496
(0.055) (0.008) (0.023) (0.015) (0.260) (0.114) (0.287)
INDIA 0.169 0.013 0.040 -0.025 0.978 0.477 2.973
(0.042) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.323) (0.490) (0.226)
INDONESIA -0.006 0.021 -0.015 -0.006 8.187 1.294 2.477
(0.018) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.255) (0.290)
JAPAN 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.006 2.752 0.380 3.051
(0.018) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.100) (0.538) (0.218)
KOREA -0.083 0.074 0.018 0.022 3.474 0.752 1.512
(0.012) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.062) (0.386) (0.470)
MALAYSIA -0.676 0.124 0.027 -0.062 7.950 3.361 3.428
(0.080) (0.025) (0.001) (0.010) (0.005) (0.067) (0.180)
NEPAL 0.245 0.098 0.020 -0.097 2.237 7.243 9.156
(0.040) (0.010) (0.001) (0.017) (0.135) (0.008) (0.010)
NEW ZEALAND -0.038 0.033 0.009 0.005 1.117 27.285 290.843
(0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.291) (0.000) (0.000)
PAKISTAN -0.381 -0.057 0.077 0.025 18.918 0.648 2.019
(0.103) (0.020) (0.015) (0.005) (0.000) (0.421) (0.364)
PAPUA N.G. 0.068 -0.072 -0.105 0.048 11.755 0.123 1.656
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.726) (0.437)
PHILLIPPINES 0.077 -0.001 0.020 -0.040 1.211 0.091 0.095
(0.059) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.271) (0.763) (0.954)
SINGAPORE 0.263 0.262 -0.014 0.044 2.263 2.804 7.702
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.133) (0.094) (0.021)
SRI LANKA -0.030 0.102 -0.025 0.078 0.116 0.131 12.004
(0.030) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009) (0.734) (0.718) (0.002)
THAILAND -0.129 0.041 0.029 0.015 5.480 0.169 0.894
(0.035) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.019) (0.681) (0.640)
LY: log of GDP; DCBY: domestic credit issued by bank/GDP; BM: broad money/GDP;
TY: trade/GDP; GOVY: government expenditure/GDP; GSY: gross savings/GDP;
CPI: inflation measured by CPI.
For column (a): numbers in paranthesis are st.errors. 
For column (b): numbers in paranthesis are p-values. 
The H(0, 1) statistic tests the determininstic cointegrating restriction and 
the H(1, q) statistic tests stochastic cointegration.
* countries with no cointegration
β (a)
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Table 2.11 ECM and SURECM Results
Model 1 LY = f(DCBY, TY, GOVY, CPI)
countries Regular
ECM: a) all
Australia 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bangladesh 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
China 0.001 -0.004 *** -0.002 *
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
India -0.004 -0.001 ** -0.005 *** -0.001 **
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Indonesia -0.002 -0.006 *** -0.014 *** -0.007 *** -0.002 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Japan 0.002 0.012 -0.000 0.011
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Korea 0.007 -0.012 *** -0.003 -0.013 ***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Malaysia 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Nepal -0.031 -0.025 *** -0.010 -0.027 ***
(0.027) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
New Zealand 0.013 -0.001 -0.012 *** -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Pakistan -0.000 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PNG -0.009 -0.047 ** -0.003 -0.045 *
(0.026) (0.022) (0.032) (0.026)
Phillippines 0.000 -0.001 ** -0.003 *** -0.000 -0.001 **
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Singapore 0.002 -0.000 ** -0.000 * -0.000 **
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sri Lanka 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Thailand 0.004 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
with restrictions -0.000 *** -0.000 ** -0.001 *** -0.002 ** -0.000 *** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
chi2 44.820 3.710 70.210 22.850 150.750 12.770
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
λ:
SURECM:
b) high inc. c) middle inc. d) low inc. e) all w/o China f) middle inc w/o China
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Table 2.12 ECM and SURECM Results
Model 2 LY= f(DCBY, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
countries Regular
ECM: a) all
Australia -0.001 -0.002 *** -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bangladesh -0.002 ** -0.003 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
China -0.001 -0.002 *** -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
India -0.004 * -0.009 *** -0.007 ** -0.009 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Indonesia 0.008 -0.000 *** 0.021 0.021 0.006
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Japan 0.021 -0.046 *** -0.021 ** -0.088 ***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
Korea -0.001 * -0.002 *** -0.000 -0.001 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Malaysia -0.000 -0.001 *** -0.000 -0.001 *** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nepal 0.006 -0.026 *** -0.028 *** -0.03 ***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
New Zealand 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Pakistan 0.001 0.01 0.011 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
PNG 0.021 -0.046 0.001 -0.038
(0.035) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039)
Phillippines -0.000 -0.001 *** 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Singapore -0.002 * -0.007 *** -0.005 *** -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Sri Lanka 0.000 -0.003 *** -0.007 ** -0.006 ** -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Thailand -0.002 ** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.009 *** -0.002 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
with restrictions -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 ** -0.001 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
chi2 128.020 18.680 41.630 24.25 232.160 12.240
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
λ:
SURECM:
b) high inc. c) middle inc. d) low inc. e) all w/o China f) middle inc w/o China
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Table 2.13 ECM and SURECM Results
Model 3 LY = f(BM, TY, GOVY, CPI)
countries Regular
ECM: a) all
Australia 0.002 0.002 -0.002 ** 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bangladesh 0.011 0.016 0.004 0.014
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
China 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
India -0.003 ** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Indonesia 0.015 0.022 0.035 0.018 0.016
(0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Japan 0.008 -0.016 *** 0.012 -0.02 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Korea 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Malaysia -0.000 -0.003 *** -0.001 ** -0.002 *** -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Nepal 0.001 -0.015 *** -0.02 *** -0.015 ***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
New Zealand 0.017 -0.051 *** 0.005 -0.041 ***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Pakistan 0.002 -0.005 *** -0.001 -0.004 **
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
PNG -0.003 -0.028 *** -0.032 -0.013
(0.014) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011)
Phillippines 0.002 0.003 0.02 0.000 0.006
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Singapore -0.002 -0.006 *** -0.004 ** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sri Lanka 0.004 0.006 -0.032 ** 0.021 -0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012)
Thailand -0.001 -0.004 *** -0.004 -0.003 * -0.001 **
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
with restrictions 0.000 -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.004 *** -0.001 *** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
chi2 293.940 18.010 290.450 23.200 255.710 11.570
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
λ:
SURECM:
b) high inc. c) middle inc.d) low inc. e) all w/o China f) middle inc w/o China
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Table 2.14 ECM and SURECM Results
Model 4 LY= f(BM, GOVY, GSY, CPI)
countries Regular
ECM: a) all
Australia 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Bangladesh -0.008 ** -0.011 *** -0.003 * -0.011 ***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
China 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
India -0.011 *** -0.019 *** -0.01 *** -0.019 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Indonesia -0.019 -0.063 *** -0.029 *** -0.061 *** -0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007)
Japan -0.084 * -0.243 *** -0.141 *** -0.214 ***
(0.044) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019)
Korea -0.006 * -0.010 *** -0.012 *** -0.010 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Malaysia 0.000 -0.002 *** -0.001 -0.002 *** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Nepal 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Zealand 0.008 -0.000 0.003 -0.006
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
Pakistan -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
PNG -0.009 -0.063 *** -0.062 *** -0.066 ***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
Phillippines 0.000 -0.009 *** -0.030 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 ***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Singapore 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sri Lanka 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Thailand -0.002 -0.006 * 0.003 -0.005 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
with restrictions -0.001 *** 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
chi2 426.310 25.000 288.880 76.290 229.440 13.640
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
Note: * , ** and *** denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively.
Numbers in the paranthesis represent standard errors.
λ:
SURECM:
b) high inc. c) middle inc. d) low inc. e) all w/o China f) middle inc w/o China
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